Playing Hide and Seek: How Lenders Respond to Borrower Protection
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Benzarti, Youssef
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0034-6535
DOI：
10.1162/rest_a_01167
发表日期：
2024-03
页码：
384-393
关键词：
摘要：
This paper uses the universe of mortgage contracts to estimate the response of high-interest lenders to borrower protection regulations aimed at simplifying and making loan terms more transparent. Using a quasi-experimental design, I find that lenders substantially reduce interest rates-by an average of 10%-in order to avoid being subject to borrower protection, without reducing amounts loaned or the number of loans approved. This finding is consistent with high-interest lenders preferring to issue obfuscatory mortgage contracts with lower interest rates rather than more transparent and regulated mortgages with higher interest rates.
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