Dynamic Incentives in Retirement Earnings-Replacement Benefits

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dean, Andres; Fleitas, Sebastian; Zerpa, Mariana
• 署名单位: Universidad de la Republica, Uruguay; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universidad de Chile; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01193
• 发表日期: 2024-05
• 页码: 762-777
• 关键词: financial incentives; programs evidence; tax compliance; LABOR; EFFICIENCY; insurance

摘要

We analyze dynamic incentives in pension systems created by the use of a small set of final years of earnings to compute benefits. Using social security records and household surveys from Uruguay, we show that self-employed workers and some employees of small firms respond to these incentives by increasing reported earnings in the benefit calculation window. We find evidence that suggests that these responses are explained by changes in earnings reporting and not in total earnings or labor supply. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that this behavior increases the cost of pensions by about 0.2% of the GDP.