Explaining the evolution of gossip

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pan, Xinyue; Hsiao, Vincent; Nau, Dana S.; Gelfand, Michele J.
• 署名单位: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Stanford University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0027-13731
• DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2214160121
• 发表日期: 2024-02-27
• 关键词: Reputation; MODEL; cues

摘要

Gossip, the exchange of personal information about absent third parties, is ubiquitous in human societies. However, the evolution of gossip remains a puzzle. The current article proposes an evolutionary cycle of gossip and uses an agent- based evolutionary game- theoretic model to assess it. We argue that the evolution of gossip is the joint conse-quence of its reputation dissemination and selfishness deterrence functions. Specifically, the dissemination of information about individuals' reputations leads more individuals to condition their behavior on others' reputations. This induces individuals to behave more cooperatively toward gossipers in order to improve their reputations. As a result, gossiping has an evolutionary advantage that leads to its proliferation. The evolution of gossip further facilitates these two functions of gossip and sustains the evolutionary cycle.