作者：Wansley, Matthew
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：A regulatory ageng is captured if, instead of the public interest, it pursues the interests of powerfid firms it is intended to regulate. Scholars disagree about which agencies are captured, how they become captured, and what reforms, if any, can prevent capture. There is consensus on one issue: capture is a vice. In this Article, I argue that capture can be a virtue. When powerful interest groups thwart justified regulation, the optimal strategy for pursuing that regulation may be to indirect...
作者：Mead, Joseph; Fromherz, Nicholas
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Cleveland State University; University System of Ohio; Cleveland State University
摘要：For more than one hundred years, Congress has experimented with review of agency action by single judge district courts, multiple-judge district courts, and direct review by circuit courts. This tinkering has not given way to a stable design. Rather than settling on a uniform scheme or at least a scheme with a discernible organizing principle Congress has left litigants with a jurisdictional maze that varies unpredictably across and within statutes and agencies. In this Article, we offer a fre...
作者：Levin, Ronald
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
作者：Grossman, Lewis
作者单位：American University
摘要：This Essay traces the still-evolving view of consumers of products regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as capable, rational, and rights-bearing decision makers. It also examines the corresponding diminution of FDA's role as a paternalistic gatekeeper working with medical and scientific experts to prevent products and manufacturer provided information about products from reaching the public. Compared with their 1960s counterparts, today's consumers of food and drugs have far gre...
作者：Rosen, Jeffrey; Callanan, Brian
作者：Fox, Jacqueline
作者单位：University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
