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作者：Caselli, Francesco; Tesei, Andrea
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We study theoretically and empirically whether natural resource windfalls affect political regimes. We show that windfalls have no effect on democracies, while they have heterogeneous political consequences in autocracies. In deeply entrenched autocracies, the effect of windfalls is virtually nil, while in moderately entrenched autocracies, windfalls significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of the political system. To frame the empirical work, we present a simple model in which political...
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作者：Groh, Matthew; Krishnan, Nandini; McKenzie, David; Vishwanath, Tara
作者单位：The World Bank; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：This study examines the impact of a randomized experiment in Jordan in which female community college graduates were assigned to receive a wage subsidy voucher. The wage voucher led to a 38 percentage point increase in employment in the short run, but the average effect is much smaller and no longer statistically significant after the voucher period has expired. The extra job experience gained as a result of the wage subsidy does not provide a stepping-stone to new jobs for these recent gradua...
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作者：Huang, Wei; Lei, Xiaoyan; Zhao, Yaohui
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Peking University
摘要：This paper examines an unintended response to the one-child policy in China: births of twins. Analysis of population census data shows that the one-child policy has accounted for more than one-third of the increase in the reported births of twins since the 1970s. Investigation using birth spacing with prior births and height difference within twins suggests that the increase in the birth of twins is partly due to parents reporting regularly spaced children as twins to avoid the policy violatio...
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作者：Kraay, Aart; Murrell, Peter
作者单位：The World Bank; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Corruption estimates rely largely on self-reports of affected individuals and officials. Yet survey respondents are often reticent to tell the truth about sensitive subjects, leading to downward biases in surveybased corruption estimates. This paper develops a method to estimate the prevalence of reticent behavior and reticence-adjusted rates of corruption using survey responses to sensitive questions. A statistical model captures how respondents answer a combination of conventional and random...
