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作者：Barnes, Tiffany D.; Beaulieu, Emily; Saxton, Gregory W.
作者单位：University of Kentucky
摘要：Recent studies show a clear link between women in government and reduced concerns about corruption. Until now, it remains unclear which underlying attitudes about women explain the perception that they will reduce corruption. Using a survey question about adding women to a police force, with an embedded experimental treatment, we examine three distinct stereotypes that might explain the power of women to reduce concerns about corruption: gender stereotypes of women as more ethical and honest, ...
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作者：Sheingate, Adam; Graziano, Paolo
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Padua
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作者：Borang, Frida; Cornell, Agnes; Grimes, Marcia; Schuster, Christian
作者单位：University of Gothenburg; Aarhus University; University of London; University College London
摘要：Accurate knowledge about societal conditions and public policies is an important public good in any polity, yet governments across the world differ dramatically in the extent to which they collect and publish such knowledge. This article develops and tests the argument that this variation to some extent can be traced to the degree of bureaucratic politicization in a polity. A politicized bureaucracy offers politicians greater opportunities to demand from bureaucratsand raises incentives for bu...
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作者：Allen, Richard
作者单位：International Monetary Fund
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作者：Quah, Jon S. T.
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作者：Beaulieu, Emily
作者单位：University of Kentucky
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作者：Lee, Don S.
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find ...
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作者：Chan, Kwan Nok; Lam, Wai Fung
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：Standard models of bureaucratic control argue that politicians vulnerable to asymmetric information rely on third-party monitoring to expand information supply. This solution to information asymmetry assumes that politicians can process all information that comes their way. However, advocates strategically oversupply information to crowd out rivals, making such a solution counterproductive. Using data on administrative reorganization in Hong Kong, we examine the alternative proposition that bu...
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作者：Reed, David S.
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作者：Laegreid, Per
作者单位：University of Bergen
