-
作者：Ebert, Michael; Simons, Dirk; Stecher, Jack D.
作者单位：University of Paderborn; University of Mannheim; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We study a disclosure decision for a firm's manager with many sources of private information. The presence of multiple numerical signals provides the manager with an opportunity to hide information via aggregation, presenting net amounts in order to show information in its best light. We show that this ability to aggregate fundamentally changes the nature of voluntary disclosure, due to the market's inability to verify that a report is free of strategic aggregation. We find that, in equilibriu...
-
作者：Owens, Edward L.; Wu, Joanna Shuang; Zimmerman, Jerold
作者单位：Emory University; University of Rochester
摘要：Economics challenge the specification of discretionary accrual models. Since rent-seeking firms pursue differentiated business strategies, firms in the same industry experience idiosyncratic shocks due to heterogeneous economic fundamentals and hence have different accrual-generating processes. We present evidence that idiosyncratic shocks are widespread, propagate through multiple years of financial statements, and reduce accrual models' goodness of fit. This not only affects abnormal accrual...
-
作者：Dutta, Sunil; Patatoukas, Panos N.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Using a financial reporting and valuation model, we investigate the construct validity of Basu's (1997) asymmetric timeliness (AT) regression coefficient as a measure of conditional conservatism in corporate financial reporting. We predict that the AT coefficient will be positive even in the absence of conditional conservatism, and it will vary with non-accounting factors even if the degree of conditional conservatism is held constant. Our empirical analysis shows that AT coefficient estimates...
-
作者：Guenther, David A.; Matsunaga, Steven R.; Williams, Brian M.
作者单位：University of Oregon; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We test whether tax avoidance strategies are associated with greater firm risk. We find that low tax rates tend to be more persistent than high tax rates and that measures of tax avoidance commonly used in the literature are generally not associated with either future tax rate volatility or future overall firm risk. Our evidence suggests that, on average, corporate tax avoidance is accomplished using strategies that are persistent and do not increase firm risk. We also find that the volatility...
-
作者：Joe, Jennifer R.; Vandervelde, Scott D.; Wu, Yi-Jing
作者单位：University of Delaware; University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; Texas Tech University System; Texas Tech University
摘要：Research documents significant management bias and opportunism around the discretionary inputs of audited complex estimates, including fair value measurements (FVMs), which raises questions about auditors' ability to test these estimates. We examine how the degree of quantification in client evidence and client control environment risk influence auditors' planned substantive testing of management's discretionary inputs to FVMs. We find that auditors allocate a lower proportion of effort to tes...
-
作者：Shipman, Jonathan E.; Swanquist, Quinn T.; Whited, Robert L.
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：Propensity score matching (PSM) has become a popular technique for estimating average treatment effects (ATEs) in accounting research. In this study, we discuss the usefulness and limitations of PSM relative to more traditional multiple regression (MR) analysis. We discuss several PSM design choices and review the use of PSM in 86 articles in leading accounting journals from 2008-2014. We document a significant increase in the use of PSM from zero studies in 2008 to 26 studies in 2014. However...
-
作者：Wilde, Jaron H.
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：U.S. laws provide explicit whistleblower protections and direct regulators to adopt ambitious programs to reward whistleblowing. However, there is limited evidence on whether employee whistleblowing deters financial misreporting and tax aggressiveness. Using a sample of employee whistleblower cases obtained from the U.S. government, I provide evidence that firms subject to whistleblowing allegations exhibit significant decreases in financial misreporting and tax aggressiveness, compared with c...
-
作者：Bratten, Brian; Gleason, Cristi A.; Larocque, Stephannie A.; Mills, Lillian F.
作者单位：University of Kentucky; University of Iowa; University of Notre Dame; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We provide new evidence about how analysts incorporate and improve on management ETR forecasts. Quarterly ETR reporting under the integral method provides mandatory point-estimate forecasts by management, but firms must record certain discrete'' tax items fully in the quarter in which they occur, polluting these forecasts. We investigate management ETR accuracy, analysts' decisions to mimic management's estimate, analysts' accuracy relative to each other or to management, and dispersion. Our c...
-
作者：Cheng, Lin
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This paper employs a firm-level collective bargaining dataset to investigate the effect of labor, as an important stakeholder of a firm, on debt contracting. I conjecture and provide evidence that firms with strong organized labor prefer bank loans to public bonds because, by communicating with banks privately, unionized firms can reduce the adverse selection costs while preserving the information asymmetry with organized labor. Furthermore, I show that organized labor influences the structure...
-
作者：Versano, Tsahi; Trueman, Brett
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper analyzes a manager's optimal expectations management strategy in a setting in which the manager provides forecast guidance to an analyst both privately and publicly. Conventional wisdom suggests that managers use private communications with analysts and public earnings forecasts interchangeably to guide analysts' earnings forecasts downward toward lower earnings targets. Our analysis shows that in markets with rational investors, private and public guidance play very different roles...
