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作者：Schloetzer, Jason D.; Tseng, Ayung; Yohn, Teri Lombardi; Yoon, Yeo Sang
作者单位：Georgetown University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Emory University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We find that firms are less likely to disclose information regarding a negative economic event for which the firm is likely to be blamed than a negative event for which the firm is likely to be perceived as blameless. We identify 383 material negative events (casualty accidents, oil spills, catastrophes, investor class action lawsuits) and find that firms are approximately four times less likely to disclose information following a negative blamed event than a blameless event. Consistent with d...
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作者：Aghamolla, Cyrus; Guttman, Ilan
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; New York University
摘要：We study a dynamic timing game between multiple firms, who decide when to go public in the presence of possible information externalities. A firm's IPO pricing is a function of its privately observed idiosyncratic type and the level of investor sentiment, which follows a stochastic, mean-reverting process. Firms may wish to delay their IPOs in order to observe the market reception of the offerings of their peers. We characterize the unique symmetric threshold equilibrium, whereby pioneer firms...
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作者：Yang, Jingyu; Yu, Yangxin; Zheng, Liu
作者单位：Shenzhen University; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：While prior studies generally support that equity-based compensation induces CEOs to manipulate financial reporting, there is limited direct empirical evidence on whether financial misreporting concerns affect compensation design. A key challenge for establishing a causal relationship is that misreporting incentives and compensation policies are often endogenously determined. Exploiting the exogenous reduction in litigation threat following a 1999 ruling of the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appe...
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作者：Bradshaw, Mark T.; Lock, Brandon; Wang, Xue; Zhou, Dexin
作者单位：Boston College; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：Both sell-side analysts and the media are information intermediaries in capital markets. This study investigates the association between sell-side analyst research and information in firm-specific news coverage. More frequent recent news coverage is associated with stronger market reactions to analysts' research revisions, and primarily explained by soft information in news coverage. The primary result is robust to using both an instrumental variable and a quasi-natural experimental setting to...
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作者：Li, Jing; Liu, Tingjun; Zhao, Ran
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Peking University
摘要：We examine takeover auctions when an informed bidder has better information about the target value than a rival and target shareholders. The informed bidder's information is either hard or soft, and only hard information can be credibly disclosed. We show that withholding information creates a winner's curse, thereby serving as a preemption device that deters the rival's participation. In turn, an endogenous disclosure cost arises that induces the informed bidder to optimally withhold favorabl...
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作者：He, Shaohua; Wang, K. Philip; Lisic, Ling Lei; Tan, Liang
作者单位：Lancaster University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：Whether audit firms should disclose financial statements is controversial among investors, practitioners, and regulators. The debate centers on whether audit firms' financial statements provide information about audit quality. Using hand-collected data from U.K. audit firms' financial statements, we construct four measures that capture audit firms' resource investments (i.e., human capital, workplace environment, technologies) and risk exposures (i.e., litigation provisions). We find that incr...
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作者：Bartov, Eli; Marra, Antonio; Momente, Francesco
作者单位：New York University; Bocconi University
摘要：We advance a theory asserting that CSR performance may exacerbate, not necessarily moderate, a company's negative stock price response to negative events. In testing this theory, we hypothesize and find that CSR performance alleviates (magnifies) the immediate negative stock price response to inadvertent (fraudulent) restatement announcements, and that these findings are robust to specifications that consider alternative CSR measures and a multitude of control variables shown by prior research...
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作者：Cheng, Mei; Hodder, Leslie D.; Watkins, Jessica
作者单位：University of Arizona; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Notre Dame
摘要：We document multiple dimensions of usefulness of banks' interest income sensitivity disclosures. First, we find management-generated sensitivity measures are predictive of future realized changes in net interest income. Second, we find financial analysts' forecasts of net interest income reflect information provided by interest income sensitivity disclosures. Third, we find equity market responses to interest rate shocks as well as firms' interest rate betas are larger for banks with greater d...
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作者：Gao, Xinzi; Wong, T. J.; Xia, Lijun; Yu, Gwen
作者单位：Shenzhen University; University of Southern California; Shanghai Jiao Tong University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Social ties between mutual funds and the companies in which they invest (investees) can both facilitate information transfers and encourage favoritism. Using the investment choices of mutual funds in China, we compare investment performance of holdings in companies that are socially connected to mutual funds versus those that are not. We find that funds allocate more investment to connected investees' stocks, especially when a fund is weakly monitored. This overweighting is greater in times of...
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作者：Gonzalez, George C.; Hoffman, Vicky B.; Moser, Donald V.
作者单位：University of Lethbridge; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Conventional economics assumes workers provide the same effort under penalty contracts and economically equivalent bonus contracts. However, prior research finds that although workers prefer bonus contracts, they provide more effort under penalty contracts. Given these findings, the prevalence of bonus contracts in practice is puzzling. If penalty contracts yield more worker effort, why would employers not use them more often? We conduct experimental labor markets to test whether the prior fin...
