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作者：D'Souza, Julia M.; Ramesh, K.; Shen, Min
作者单位：Cornell University; Michigan State University; George Mason University
摘要：This study examines the interdependence between institutional ownership and the speed with which Standard & Poor's disseminates corporate accounting information. From the demand-side perspective, we find that quasi-indexers, who rely on corporate accounting information as a low-cost monitoring system, are the key driver of the institutional demand for speedy information dissemination. In addition, dissemination speed increases substantially for stocks listed in major market indices but decreas...
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作者：Leone, Andrew J.; Liu, Michelle
作者单位：University of Miami; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This study tests the hypothesis that founder CEOs are less likely to be fired than non-founder CEOs when accounting irregularities are disclosed. We also examine whether CFOs are more likely to shoulder the blame when the CEO is a founder. Using a sample of 96 newly public firms with accounting irregularities, and a control sample of similar newly public firms, we document that the probability of CEO (CFO) turnover in the wake of an accounting irregularity is lower (higher) when the firm's CEO...
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作者：Caskey, Judson; Nagar, Venky; Petacchi, Paolo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Massachusetts System; University Massachusetts Dartmouth
摘要：This study models a manager who privately reports earnings to an independent audit committee that, after its own due diligence, modifies the report for public release to investors. The audit committee alters the reporting and valuation dynamics by attempting to remove the manager's reporting bias, but then presents the information it has collected with its own bias. The audit committee's presence changes the impact of penalties and incentives on reporting, valuation, and due-diligence activiti...
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作者：Brazel, Joseph F.; Carpenter, Tina D.; Jenkins, J. Gregory
作者单位：North Carolina State University; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：Audit standards require auditors to conduct fraud brainstorming sessions on every audit. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has raised concerns about auditors' fraud judgments and the quality of their brainstorming sessions. We develop a measure of brainstorming quality to examine how it affects auditors' fraud decision-making processes. We test our measure using field survey data of auditors' actual brainstorming sessions for 179 audit engagements. Respondents report considerable v...
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作者：Kim, Dongcheol; Qi, Yaxuan
作者单位：Korea University; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：This study examines whether and how earnings quality, measured as accruals quality (AQ), affects the cost of equity capital. Using two-stage cross-sectional regression tests, we find that the AQ risk factor is significantly priced, after controlling for low-priced stocks. This result is robust in tests using individual stocks, various portfolio formations, and different beta estimations. Furthermore, we show that AQ and its pricing effect systematically vary with business cycles and macroecono...
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作者：Peecher, Mark E.; Piercey, M. David; Rich, Jay S.; Tubbs, Richard M.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; Illinois State University; University of Iowa
摘要：Prior research shows that an audit supervisor's active intervention in a subordinate's judgment distorts that judgment. However, subordinates' judgments are only one input into audit team judgments. How do supervisors finalize audit team judgments after actively intervening in their subordinates' judgments? In an experiment using audit teams, supervisors with weaker or stronger goals to reach a client-preferred conclusion either were or were not asked to first actively coach a subordinate's ju...
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作者：Gow, Ian D.; Ormazabal, Gaizka; Taylor, Daniel J.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Stanford University
摘要：We review and evaluate the methods commonly used in the accounting literature to correct for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. While much of the accounting literature studies settings in which variables are cross-sectionally and serially correlated, we find that the extant methods are not robust to both forms of dependence. Contrary to claims in the literature, we find that the Z2 statistic and Newey-West corrected Fama-MacBeth standard errors do not correct for both cross-sectional ...
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作者：Seybert, Nicholas
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Prior research finds that mandatory expensing induces underinvestment in research and development (R&D). The current study investigates whether capitalization can also create R&D investment problems. Abandoning a capitalized project requires asset impairment, a negative reporting effect that could damage managers' reputations. In an experiment utilizing M.B.A. student participants, I find that managers responsible for initiating an R&D project are more likely to overinvest when R&D is capitali...
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作者：Hunton, James E.; Gold, Anna
作者单位：Bentley University; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：The current study examines the outcomes of three fraud brainstorming procedures-nominal group, round robin, and open discussion-via a randomized between-participant field experiment involving 150 audit clients and 2,614 auditors who participated in natural, hierarchical audit teams. The results indicate that nominal group and round robin brainstorming resulted in equivalent numbers of unique fraud risks and comparable increases in planned audit hours, while open discussion brainstorming yielde...
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作者：Dyreng, Scott D.; Hanlon, Michelle; Maydew, Edward L.
作者单位：Duke University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：This study investigates whether individual top executives have incremental effects on their firms' tax avoidance that cannot be explained by characteristics of the firm. To identify executive effects on firms' effective tax rates, we construct a data set that tracks the movement of 908 executives across firms over time. Results indicate that individual executives play a significant role in determining the level of tax avoidance that firms undertake. The economic magnitude of the executive effe...
