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作者：Chiu, Peng-Chia; Teoh, Siew Hong; Tian, Feng
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We test whether earnings management spreads between firms via shared directors. We find that a firm is more likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a firm that is currently managing earnings and is less likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a non-manipulator. Earnings management contagion is stronger when the shared director has a leadership or accounting-relevant position (e. g., audit committee chair or member) on its board or the contagious ...
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作者：Hoi, Chun Keung; Wu, Qiang; Zhang, Hao
作者单位：Rochester Institute of Technology; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
摘要：We examine the empirical association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and tax avoidance. Our findings suggest that firms with excessive irresponsible CSR activities have a higher likelihood of engaging in tax-sheltering activities and greater discretionary/permanent book-tax differences. Moreover, at the onset of FASB Interpretation No. 48, these firms have more uncertain tax positions; also, these firms' initial tax positions are likely supported by weaker facts and circumstances...
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作者：Chen, Zhihong; Guan, Yuyan; Ke, Bin
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Nanyang Technological University
摘要：We examine the determinants and consequences of stock option compensation to directors of state-controlled Chinese firms that are incorporated outside China and listed in Hong Kong, referred to as state-controlled Red Chip firms, over the period 1990-2005. We find that state-controlled Red Chip firms granted directors a significant number of stock options in response to the demand of foreign investors. However, state-controlled Red Chip firms forced the directors to forfeit a significant perce...
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作者：Dai, Zhonglan; Shackelford, Douglas A.; Zhang, Harold H.; Chen, Chongyang
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We argue that reductions in shareholder taxes should lower the cost of equity capital more for financially constrained firms than for other companies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that, following the 1997 (TRA) and the 2003 (JGTRRA) cuts in U. S. individual shareholder taxes, financially constrained firms enjoyed larger reductions in their cost of equity capital than did other firms. The results are consistent with the incidence of the tax reductions falling mostly on firms with bo...
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作者：Ramalingegowda, Santhosh; Wang, Chuan-San; Yu, Yong
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; National Taiwan University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Miller and Modigliani's (1961) dividend irrelevance theorem predicts that in perfect capital markets dividend policy should not affect investment decisions. Yet in imperfect markets, external funding constraints that stem from information asymmetry can force firms to forgo valuable investment projects in order to pay dividends. We find that high-quality financial reporting significantly mitigates the negative effect of dividends on investments, especially on R&D investments. Further, this miti...
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作者：Efendi, Jap; Files, Rebecca; Ouyang, Bo; Swanson, Edward P.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Arlington; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We find that the likelihood of forced turnover in the CEO and CFO positions is significantly higher for firms in the aftermath of option backdating than in propensity-score matched control firms. Forced turnover occurs in about 36 percent of the accused firms. The forced turnover rates for CEOs and CFOs are similar and several times higher than normal. The displaced managers are further punished by the managerial labor market, as they are much less likely than control firm managers to be rehir...
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作者：Gu, Zhaoyang; Li, Zengquan; Yang, Yong George
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：Regulators and the investment community have been concerned that institutional investors pressure financial analysts through trading commission fees to issue optimistic opinions in support of their stock positions. We use a unique dataset that identifies mutual fund companies' allocation of trading commission fees to individual brokerages and provide direct evidence on this issue. In particular, we show that for stocks in which the fund companies have taken large positions, analysts are more o...
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作者：Vrettos, Dimitris
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：This study offers evidence that the use of RPE (Relative Performance Evaluation) in CEO incentive contracting depends on the type of strategic competition between a firm and its peers. Specifically, CEO pay is negatively (positively) associated with peer-group performance when firms compete as strategic substitutes (complements). This finding suggests that firms provide CEO incentives in order to influence strategic interaction with peer firms. Further, the directionally opposite pay-for-peer-...
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作者：Zhang, Xiao-Jun
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This study demonstrates that stocks with low book-to-market ratios, also known as glamour stocks, have significantly more positive skewness in their return distributions compared to the return distributions of value stocks with high book-to-market ratios. The premium (discount) investors apply to these glamour (value) stocks also correlates significantly with the difference in return skewness. These findings suggest that the value/glamour-stock puzzle is partially explained by investor prefere...
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作者：Erickson, Merle M.; Heitzman, Shane M.; Zhang, X. Frank
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Rochester; Yale University
摘要：This paper examines the implications of tax loss carryback incentives for corporate reporting decisions and capital market behavior. During the 1981 through 2010 sample period, we find that firms increase losses in order to claim a cash refund of recent tax payments before the option to do so expires, and we estimate that firms with tax refund-based incentives accelerate about $64.7 billion in losses. Tax-motivated loss shifting is reflected in both recurring and nonrecurring items and is more...
