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作者：Evans, John Harry, III; Luo, Shuqing; Nagarajan, Nandu J.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National University of Singapore
摘要：The design of CEO incentives is particularly important for firms in financial distress. We compare the resolution of CEO incentive problems in distressed firms between the 1980s versus the 1990s, focusing on how changes in contractual provisions, as well as in the executive labor market, resulted in a shift to a new equilibrium. Our analyses provide evidence that the increased bargaining power of creditors, together with changes in the use of contractual provisions in the 1990s, enabled credit...
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作者：Taylor, Eileen Z.
作者单位：North Carolina State University
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作者：Matsumura, Ella Mae; Prakash, Rachna; Vera-Munoz, Sandra C.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Mississippi; University of Notre Dame
摘要：Using hand-collected carbon emissions data for 2006 to 2008 that were voluntarily disclosed to the Carbon Disclosure Project by S&P 500 firms, we examine the effects on firm value of carbon emissions and of the act of voluntarily disclosing carbon emissions. Correcting for self-selection bias from managers' decisions to disclose carbon emissions, we find that, on average, for every additional thousand metric tons of carbon emissions, firm value decreases by $212,000, where the median emissions...
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作者：Upton, Wayne S.
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作者：Bennett, G. Bradley; Hatfield, Richard C.
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
摘要：This study provides both survey and experimental evidence to consider how social interactions between staff-level auditors and client management may affect staff auditors' perceptions and influence their decisions regarding the collection of audit evidence. During fieldwork, staff-level auditors have extensive interaction with client management. Survey evidence suggests that these staff-level auditors are often mismatched'' with client management, in terms of their experience, age, and account...
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作者：Libby, Robert; Brown, Timothy
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Current IFRS requires significant disaggregation of income statement numbers while such disaggregation is voluntary and much less common under U.S. GAAP. We examine whether voluntary disaggregation of income statement numbers increases the reliability of income statement subtotals because auditors permit less misstatement in the disaggregated numbers. In our experiment, experienced auditors require correction of smaller errors in disaggregated numbers. Auditors also believe that greater disagg...
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作者：Tafkov, Ivo D.
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：This study investigates the conditions under which providing relative performance information to employees has a positive effect on performance when compensation is not tied to peer performance. Specifically, I investigate, via an experiment, the effect of relative performance information (present or absent) on performance under two compensation contracts (flat-wage or individual performance-based). Given the presence of relative performance information, I examine the effect of the type of rel...
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作者：Lobo, Gerald J.; Zhao, Yuping
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：We identify two research design issues that explain the inconsistency between the theoretically predicted negative relation between audit effort and misstatements (measured using restatements) and empirical findings. First, auditor risk adjustment behavior induces an upward bias in the association between audit effort and restatements. Second, the theoretical prediction applies only to audited financial reports (i.e., annual reports) and not to unaudited reports (i.e., interim quarterly report...
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作者：Zeff, Stephen A.
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作者：Dou, Yiwei; Hope, Ole-Kristian; Thomas, Wayne B.
作者单位：New York University; University of Toronto; University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman
摘要：Contracting parties, such as the firm and its supplier, have cost-reducing incentives to make investments that support the unique transactions between them. However, to the extent that one party may renege on its contractual obligations, the other party incurring the cost of the relationship-specific investment bears additional risk and is less willing to invest such that sub-optimal investment occurs. In countries where enforceability of explicit contracts is particularly weak, parties have i...
