-
作者:Andres, Christian; Brochet, Francois; Limbach, Peter; Schumacher, Nicola
作者单位:WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; Boston University
摘要:This study documents the performance and career outcomes of sell-side analysts with prior accounting education or experience. Analysts with accounting work experience-especially former auditors-issue more accurate earnings forecasts and more profitable sell recommendations. In contrast, analysts with only accounting education or CPA credentials do not outperform. Former auditors also ask more accounting-focused questions during earnings calls, and the firms they cover exhibit higher earnings q...
-
作者:Maksymov, Eldar; Westermann, Kimberly D.
作者单位:Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo; California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo
摘要:Calls for greater transparency in PCAOB inspections have intensified amid persistent concerns about opacity and inconsistency. We integrate prior academic research with in-depth interviews from 29 former PCAOB inspectors to construct a detailed, phase-based account of the inspection process over global network firms. We organize insights into four sequential phases-hiring, training, and performance assessment; planning; execution; and resolution-and present structured taxonomies that combine t...
-
作者:Blackburne, Terrence; Bozanic, Zahn; Johnson, Bret; Roulstone, Darren
作者单位:Oregon State University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; George Mason University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要:We examine whether firms alter their financial reporting decisions during periods of increased regulatory scrutiny. A determinants analysis reveals that the likelihood of an enforcement action for firms investigated by the SEC increases (decreases) with pre-investigation levels of accounting manipulation and irregularities (accounting conservatism). Further, while executive turnover is positively associated with enforcement actions, firms that bring more accounting expertise into their executi...
-
作者:Schantl, Stefan F.; Wagenhofer, Alfred
作者单位:University of Melbourne; University of Graz
摘要:Securities regulators frequently punish firms for their managers' misreporting. They argue that this would enhance firms' long-term value by mitigating underinvestment in compliance mechanisms, such as internal controls over financial reporting. Opponents of corporate penalties argue that the penalties would harm the very same investors already harmed by misreporting. We evaluate these arguments in a model with a capital market-oriented misreporting manager and a board of directors that invest...
-
作者:Hasan, Iftekhar; Lee, Haekwon; Qiu, Buhui; Saunders, Anthony
作者单位:Bank of Finland; Fordham University; University of Sydney; University of Sydney; New York University
摘要:U sing lenders who become members of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) as an exogenous shock, we examine whether and how lenders' commitment to transparent climate-related disclosures affects borrowers' environmental performance. We find that borrowers of TCFD-member lenders, relative to control firms, significantly improve their environmental performance after the TCFD launch. Lenders' disclosure commitments influence borrowers through credit rationing and monitor...
-
作者:Gottsche, Max; Griffin, Paul A.; Habermann, Florian; Schiemann, Frank; Spandel, Theresa
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Davis; University of Lausanne; Otto Friedrich University Bamberg; University of Hamburg
-
作者:Kubic, Matthew
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要:The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandates disclosure of Article 11 pro forma financial statements (pro formas) for acquisitions that exceed one of three bright-line materiality thresholds. Motivated by two theories of mandated disclosure, I investigate the conditions under which mandated pro forma disclosure improves forecast accuracy and mitigates incentive alignment problems. My findings indicate that pro formas reduce post-acquisition forecast errors when there is a weak pr...
-
作者:Mohanram, Partha; Sun, Wei; Xin, Baohua; Zhu, Jigao
作者单位:University of Toronto; China Agricultural University; University of International Business & Economics
摘要:This paper investigates the effects of a regulatory change in China of the presentation format for research and development (R&D) expense, which mandates public firms to explicitly present R&D expense on their income statements. We predict that this regulation will impact nonstate-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), which care about stock market valuation, more than state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that non-SOEs report significantly higher R&D expense post regulation. Furthermore, the R&D inc...
-
作者:Saffar, Walid; Sun, Yuan; Zhang, Janus Jian
作者单位:Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Hong Kong Baptist University
摘要:Anti-recharacterization laws significantly increase the rights of securitization creditors by allowing the buyers of securitized assets to exclusively and immediately seize collateral in bankruptcy. However, strengthening the rights of securitization creditors can limit other creditors' ability to recover loans. We find that, after a state adopts an anti-recharacterization law, local banks operating in the same state accrue more loan loss provisions, tighten their loan contracts, and incur hig...
-
作者:Lamoreaux, Phillip T.; Liu, Summer Zhujun; Newton, Nathan J.; Zhang, Min
作者单位:Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Renmin University of China
摘要:Research suggests that board members value financial reporting quality because executive dismissal often follows low reporting quality events. However, inferences about the board's demand for reporting quality in these studies are confounded by board members' reputation incentives because the events examined are public (e.g., restatements). We investigate boards' demand for reporting quality by exploiting a private signal of misreporting: audit adjustments communicated to the Board by the exte...