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作者：Rebello, Michael; Wei, Kelsey D.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We examine proprietary research produced by buy-side analysts working for a large fund management company. We find that the buy-side research has investment value for a one-year horizon, and the analysts producing this research exhibit differential ability that tends to persist over time. The buy-side research strongly influences trades made by the company's funds, especially when it coveys information that is independent of the fund managers' own information, when it is produced by buy-side a...
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作者：Houston, Joel F.; Jiang, Liangliang; Lin, Chen; Ma, Yue
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Lingnan University; University of Hong Kong; City University of Hong Kong
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作者：Lo, Alvis K.
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：I examine whether declines in banks' financial health affect their borrowers' disclosures. Prior studies indicate that, in relationship lending, banks and borrowers rely on private communication, rather than public disclosures, to resolve information asymmetries. When banking relationships are threatened, borrowers must turn to new funding sources, inducing them to reconsider their disclosure policies. This paper predicts that borrowers, whose banking relationships are threatened by declining ...
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作者：Soltes, Eugene
作者单位：Harvard University
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作者：Chen, Jeff Zeyun; Shane, Philip B.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; William & Mary
摘要：This paper decomposes the cash component of earnings and analyzes persistence characteristics and pricing implications of various subcomponents, with particular attention to changes in cash. Changes in underlying fundamentals might dictate changes in cash to new optimal levels. Alternatively, suboptimal changes in cash might result from agency costs allowing managers' actions to diverge from the best interests of shareholders. We predict and find that both suboptimal increases and decreases in...
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作者：Hail, Luzi; Tahoun, Ahmed; Wang, Clare
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of London; London Business School; Northwestern University
摘要：We examine changes in firms' dividend payouts following an exogenous shock to the information asymmetry problem between managers and investors. Agency theories predict a decrease in dividend payments to the extent that improved public information lowers managers' need to convey their commitment to avoid overinvestment via costly dividend payouts. Conversely, dividends could increase if minority investors are in a better position to extract cash dividends. We test these predictions by analyzing...
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作者：Wagenhofer, Alfred
作者单位：University of Graz
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作者：Beyer, Anne; Guttman, Ilan; Marinovic, Ivan
作者单位：Stanford University; New York University
摘要：We study optimal compensation contracts that (1) are designed to address a joint moral hazard and adverse selection problem and that (2) are based on performance measures, which may be manipulated by the agent at a cost. In the model, a manager is privately informed about his productivity prior to being hired by a firm. In order to incentivize the manager to exert productive effort, the firm designs a compensation contract that is based on reported earnings, which can be manipulated by the man...
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作者：Cready, William; Kumas, Abdullah; Subasi, Musa
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Richmond; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
摘要：The use of observed transaction sizes to differentiate between small and large investor trading patterns is widespread. A significant concern in such studies is spurious effects attributable to misclassification of transactions, particularly those originating from large investors. Such effects can arise unintentionally, strategically, or endogenously. We examine comprehensive records of a sample of institutional investors (i.e., large traders), including their order sizes and overall position ...
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作者：Brown, Timothy J.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This paper proposes that psychological factors can change managers' beliefs about earnings management when they choose to engage in it. I show that, under certain circumstances, engaging in a small amount of earnings management alters a manager's beliefs about the appropriateness of the act, which may increase the likelihood of further earnings management. Specifically, I predict and find in two experiments that participants who initially choose to manage earnings are motivated to rationalize ...
