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作者：Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. E.
作者单位：Universitetet i Stavanger; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：Reward systems based on balanced scorecards often connect pay to an index, that is, a weighted sum of multiple performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are nonverifiable so that the contracting parties must rely on self-enforcement. Under commonly invoked assumptions (including normally distributed measurements), we show that the weights in the index reflect a tradeoff between distortion and precision for the measures. The efficien...
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作者：Binz, Oliver; Hills, Robert; Kubic, Matthew
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We examine whether the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Codification made it easier for preparers and auditors to locate relevant accounting guidance. We find that areas of U.S. GAAP with more dispersed and voluminous guidance before the Codification experience a larger post-Codification reduction in restatements. We find a similar decline in SEC comment letter questions referencing areas of U.S. GAAP with more dispersed and voluminous pre-Codification guidance. Our results suggest ...
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作者：Wang, Lynn linghuan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper studies whether and how environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure regulations imposed on banks generate transmission effects along the lending channel. I use a setting of U.S. firms borrowing from non-U.S. banks and exploit the staggered adoption of ESG disclosure regulations in banks' home countries. I find that exposed borrowers of affected banks improve their environmental and social (E&S) performance following the disclosure mandate. Consistent with banks enhancing ...
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作者：Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要：A firm that must decide whether to retain or terminate a manager can rely on several sources of information to assess managerial ability. When it relies on a performance signal and monitoring, we show that a more informative signal can surprisingly increase the value of monitoring. Then, signal precision and monitoring are complements. This happens if a more precise information system makes some signals more negative indicators of managerial ability that still do not trigger termination. When ...
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作者：Gore, Angela K.; Ji, Yuan; Kulp, Susan L.
作者单位：George Washington University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Arlington
摘要：We explore whether municipalities with public sector unions exploit aspects of governmental (or fund) accounting to obscure the availability of discretionary resources in fund balance accounts, relative to municipalities without public sector unions. We first investigate whether governments with unions report higher proportions of discretionary resources outside of the general fund, a primary measure of financial health, and instead within less prominent fund types. Second, we explore whether ...
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作者：Chen, C. H. E. N.; LI, Leonard leye; Lu, Louise yi; Wang, R. E. N. C. H. E. N. G.
作者单位：Monash University; University of New South Wales Sydney; Australian National University; Singapore Management University
摘要：Using influenza epidemic data, we examine how constraints on corporate information production affect disclosure policies. We find that firms in areas with higher flu activity are less likely to issue short-run earnings forecasts and more likely to issue long-run earnings forecasts. These results are more pronounced when the information production process is more complex, when managers face a greater reputational loss for issuing low-quality short-run forecasts, and when firms' costs of switchi...
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作者：Choi, Jung Ho; Pacelli, Joseph; Rennekamp, Kristina M.; Tomar, Sorabh
作者单位：Stanford University; Harvard University; Cornell University; Southern Methodist University
摘要：We examine how information about the diversity of a potential employer's workforce affects individuals' job-seeking behavior. We embed a field experiment in job recommendation emails from a leading career advice agency in the United States. The experimental treatment involves highlighting a diversity metric to jobseekers. Our results indicate that disclosing diversity scores in job postings leads jobseekers to click on firms with higher diversity scores, with such effects varying across jobsee...
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作者：Chan, Eric W. W.; Lill, Jeremy B. B.; Maas, Victor S. S.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Kansas; University of Amsterdam
摘要：Managers often face the choice between promoting an internal employee and hiring an external candidate. Using an interactive experiment, we examine the drivers of managers' promote/hire decisions and internal employees' behavior before and after those decisions. Consistent with gift exchange theory, we find that employees exert costly effort to increase the chance of being promoted, and they raise their effort level as the promote/hire decision becomes imminent. Managers respond by promoting t...
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作者：Liu, Lisa Yao; Lu, Shirley
作者单位：Columbia University; Harvard University
摘要：We show that information exposure through international business networks enables firms to take proactive measures that benefit employees and potentially the local community. Specifically, in the early days of COVID-19, firms that have business networks with China and Italy are more likely to be aware of the severity of the disease, and proactively implement work-from-home (WFH) policies that can protect their employees. Using Safegraph foot traffic data, we find a higher stay-at-home ratio be...
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作者：Chow, Travis; Fan, Zhongwen; Huang, Li; Li, Oliver Zhen; Li, Siman
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; City University of Hong Kong; Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting & Finance; National University of Singapore; Xiamen University
摘要：In a tax-public goods reciprocity framework between citizens and the state, managers view taxes as a payment to the government in exchange for public goods, and hence they adjust their willingness to pay taxes as public good quality changes. We show that corporate tax planning intensity increases with ground-level ozone pollution. Revisions in ozone pollution regulations cause counties that failed the revised and more stringent standards to reduce ozone pollution. Consequently, firms headquart...
