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作者：Cram, Donald P.; Karan, Vijay; Stuart, Iris
作者单位：California State University System; California State University Fullerton
摘要：We consider three technical errors in the statistical analysis of choice-based and matched-sample studies in accounting research. These problems constitute threats both to the internal and external validity of the research. First, we note that researchers have often failed to control for the effects of matching variables used in sample selection. Commonly, researchers believe that the selection of a matched sample already controls for the matching variables and hence controlling for them in an...
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作者：Hirshleifer, David; Teoh, Siew Hong
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We offer here the psychological attraction approach to accounting and disclosure rules, regulation, and policy as a program for positive accounting research. We suggest that psychological forces have shaped and continue to shape rules and policies in two different ways: (1) good rules for bad users-rules and policies that provide information in a form that is useful for users who are subject to bias and cognitive processing constraints; and (2) bad rules-superfluous or even pernicious rules an...
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作者：Weber, David P.
作者单位：University of Connecticut
摘要：Recent research reports that book-tax differences are not only informative about future earnings but are also associated with future stock returns. The combination of these results suggests the possibility that investors misprice securities by not fully incorporating taxbased information into their earnings expectations. However, because the stock market's expectations are not observable, predictable future returns may instead simply reflect differences in risk. I exploit financial analysts' e...
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作者：Menon, Krishnagopal; Williams, David D.
作者单位：Boston University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We investigate chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) changes in firms that experience an auditor resignation. We argue that boards of directors have incentives to replace these managers following an auditor resignation both to improve financial reporting performance and to restore reporting credibility. We use two control samples, one matched on industry and size and the other comprising firms that experienced client-initiated auditor changes. We observe higher turnov...
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作者：Peecher, Mark E.; Piercey, M. David
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：Considerable auditing research shows that individuals exhibit outcome effects when judging audit quality. They judge auditor negligence as more likely when given information about adverse audit outcomes. Many studies conclude that outcome information biases individuals against auditors, and/or attempt to improve their judgements by reducing outcome effects. Yet, individuals generally should judge auditors more harshly when given adverse outcomes. A key question is whether individuals' belief r...
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作者：Eldenburg, Leslie G.; Krishnan, Ranjani
作者单位：University of Arizona; Michigan State University
摘要：This paper analyzes the association among ownership, top management incentives, and expenditures on accounting information. We argue that organizations with privately appointed boards of directors such as for-profit and nongovernmental nonprofit organizations use incentive pay practices that encourage managers to use accounting information to improve performance. In contrast, government organizations are publicly governed and are constrained in their compensation practices because hospital CEO...
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作者：Archambeault, Deborah S.; Dezoort, F. Todd; Hermanson, Dana R.
作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University System of Georgia; Kennesaw State University
摘要：This study investigates whether incentive-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with accounting restatements. We use an agency framework to predict that short-term (long-term) incentive compensation for audit committee members will increase (decrease) the likelihood of accounting restatements due to error or fraud. Using a matched-sample logistic regression with 153 restatement and 153 nonrestatement companies, we find the predicted positive relation between short-term i...
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作者：Widener, Sally K.; Shackell, Margaret B.; Demers, Elizabeth A.
作者单位：Rice University; Cornell University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：This study investigates how the relatively contemporary phenomenon of social surveillance controls, such as the use of teams and managerial monitoring, affects the design of the firm's more traditional organizational architecture, which is classically defined to consist of three primary components: incentive compensation, the delegation of decision rights, and performance measurement. We find that vertical surveillance (i.e., high-level monitoring) substitutes for delegation while horizontal s...
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作者：Krishnan, Gopal V.; Visvanathan, Gnanakumar
作者单位：Lehigh University; George Mason University
摘要：The Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates the disclosure of whether at least one member of the audit committee is a financial expert. However, the final version of the rule adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defined experts to include both accounting and nonaccounting experts. Did the SEC do the right thing? Are the nonaccounting experts just as competent as the accounting experts in enhancing the quality of financial reporting? For a sample of S&P 500 firms, we examine whether the ...
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作者：Lipe, Marlys Gascho
作者单位：University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman
