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作者：Bateni, MohammadHossein; Chen, Yiwei; Ciocan, Dragos Florin; Mirrokni, Vahab
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We consider a setting where a platform dynamically allocates a collection of goods that arrive to the platform in an online fashion to budgeted buyers, as exemplified by online advertising systems where platforms decide which impressions to serve to various advertisers. Such dynamic resource allocation problems are challenging for two reasons. (a) The platform must strike a balance between optimizing the advertiser's own revenues and guaranteeing fairness to the advertiser's (repeat) buyers, a...
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作者：Hsu, Wei-Kang; Xu, Jiaming; Lin, Xiaojun; Bell, Mark R.
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Duke University
摘要：We study task assignment in online service platforms, where unlabeled clients arrive according to a stochastic process and each client brings a random number of tasks. As tasks are assigned to servers, they produce client/server-dependent random payoffs. The goal of the system operator is to maximize the expected payoff per unit time subject to the servers' capacity constraints. However, both the statistics of the dynamic client population and the client-specific payoff vectors are unknown to ...
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作者：Baek, Jackie; Ma, Will
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Columbia University
摘要：Network revenue management (NRM) describes a general online allocation problem in which combinations of capacity-constrained resources are sold to a stream of arriving customers. Existing papers propose one-size-fits-all methods for controlling the resource capacities over time. In this paper, we study how different methods can be used to control different resource constraints based on the network structure of each instance. Specifically, we propose a heuristic that bifurcates the resources of...
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作者：Pang, John; Lin, Weixuan; Fu, Hu; Kleeman, Jack; Bitar, Eilyan; Wierman, Adam
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Cornell University; University of British Columbia; University of Cambridge
摘要：In this paper, we analyze the worst-case efficiency loss of online platform designs under a networked Coumot competition model. Inspired by some of the largest platforms in operation today, we study a variety of platform designs to examine the impacts of market transparency and control on the worst-case efficiency loss of Nash equilibria in networked Coumot games. Our results show that open access designs incentivize increased production toward perfectly competitive levels and limit efficiency...
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作者：Bensoussan, Alain; Hoe, SingRu (Celine); Kim, Joohyun; Yan, Zhongfeng
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; City University of Hong Kong; Texas A&M University System; Jinan University
摘要：The objective of this paper is to study the optimal consumption and portfoliochoice problem of risk-controlled investors who strive to maximize total expected discountedutility of both consumption and terminal wealth. Risk is measured by the variance of terminalwealth, which introduces a nonlinear function of the expected value into the control problem.The control problem presented is no longer a standard stochastic control problem but rather,ameanfield-type control problem. The optimal portfo...
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作者：Niazadeh, Rad; Hartline, Jason; Immorlica, Nicole; Khani, Mohammad Reza; Lucier, Brendan
作者单位：University of Chicago; Northwestern University; Amazon.com
摘要：Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multi-ple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial auction with complementar-ities, where truthful auctions such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction can yield unacceptably low revenue. We therefore study core-selecting auctions, which boost reve-nue by setting payments so that no group of agents, includin...
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作者：Besbes, Omar; Castro, Francisco; Lobel, Ilan
作者单位：Columbia University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; New York University
摘要：We study the relationship between capacity and performance for a service firm with spatial operations, in the sense that requests arrive with origin-destination pairs. An example of such a system is a ride-hailing platform in which each customer arrives in the system with the need to travel from an origin to a destination. We propose a parsimonious representation of a spatial multiserver system through a state-dependent queueing model that captures spatial frictions as well as spatial economie...
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作者：DeValve, Levi; Pekec, Sasa
作者单位：University of Chicago; Duke University
摘要：We consider ad-supported media platforms with incomplete information about the disutility consumers??? experience from exposure to advertising. We characterize the platform???s optimal menu of subscription prices and advertising quantities in monopoly and competitive settings, revealing insights on key factors influencing market outcomes. In particular, we show that incomplete information on advertising disutility decreases the optimal subscription price for consumers with low advertising disu...
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作者：Shah, Devavrat; Xie, Qiaomin; Xu, Zhi
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：In this work, we consider the popular tree-based search strategy within the framework of reinforcement learning, the Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS), in the context of the infinite-horizon discounted cost Markov decision process (MDP). Although MCTS is believed to provide an approximate value function for a given state with enough simulations, the claimed proof of this property is incomplete. This is because the variant of MCTS, the upper confidence bound for trees (UCT), analyzed in prior work...
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作者：Korpeoglu, Ersin; Korpeoglu, C. Gizem; Hafalir, Isa Emin
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Eindhoven University of Technology; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：We study multiple parallel contests in which contest organizers elicit solutions to innovation-related problems from a set of solvers. Each solver may participate in multiple contests and exert effort to improve the solution for each contest the solver enters, but the quality of the solver???s solution in each contest also depends on an output uncertainty. We first analyze whether an organizer???s profit can be improved by discouraging solvers from participating in multiple contests. We show, ...
