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作者：Honnappa, Harsha; Jain, Rahul
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Southern California; University of Southern California
摘要：Queueing networks models typically assume that the arrival process is exogenous and unaffected by admission control, scheduling policies, etc. In many situations, however, users choose the time of their arrival strategically, taking delay and other metrics into account. In this paper, we develop a framework to study such strategic arrivals into queueing networks. We study the population game wherein users strategically choose when to arrive at a parallel queueing network and upon arrival, whic...
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作者：Bertsimas, Dimitris; Brynjolfsson, Erik; Reichman, Shachar; Silberholz, John
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Tel Aviv University
摘要：Tenure decisions, key decisions in academic institutions, are primarily based on subjective assessments of candidates. Using a large-scale bibliometric database containing 198,310 papers published 1975-2012 in the field of operations research (OR), we propose prediction models of whether a scholar would perform well on a number of future success metrics using statistical models trained with data from the scholar's first five years of publication, a subset of the information available to tenure...
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作者：Jacquillat, Alexandre; Odoni, Amedeo R.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Carnegie Mellon University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Most flight delays are created by imbalances between demand and capacity at the busiest airports. Absent large increases in capacity, airport congestion can only be mitigated through scheduling interventions or improved capacity utilization. This paper presents an integrated approach that jointly optimizes the airport's flight schedule at the strategic level and the utilization of airport capacity at the tactical level, subject to scheduling, capacity, and delay-reduction constraints. The capa...
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作者：Secomandi, Nicola
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Commodity merchants use various heuristics to value leasing contracts on storage facilities as real options and make inventory trading decisions. Two prominent heuristics sequentially reoptimize simple models, leading to the so-called rolling intrinsic (RI) policy and rolling basket of spread options (RSO) policy. The extant literature numerically demonstrates that these two policies are nearly optimal in many realistic settings and can be used with Monte Carlo simulation to obtain fairly accu...
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作者：Harrison, J. Michael; Sunar, Nur
作者单位：Stanford University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We consider a firm that can use one of several costly learning modes to dynamically reduce uncertainty about the unknown value of a project. Each learning mode incurs cost at a particular rate and provides information of a particular quality. In addition to dynamic decisions about its learning mode, the firm must decide when to stop learning and either invest or abandon the project. Using a continuous-time Bayesian framework, and assuming a binary prior distribution for the project's unknown v...
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作者：Bleichrodt, Han; Keskin, Umut; Rohde, Kirsten I. M.; Spinu, Vitalie; Wakker, Peter
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Istanbul Bilgi University
摘要：We introduce a new type of preference condition for intertemporal choice, which requires present values to be independent of various other variables. The new conditions are more concise and more transparent than traditional ones. They are directly related to applications because present values are widely used tools in intertemporal choice. Our conditions give more general behavioral axiomatizations, which facilitate normative debates and empirical tests of time inconsistencies and related phen...
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作者：Liu, Yan; Cooper, William L.
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We consider an infinite-horizon single-product pricing problem in which a fraction of customers is patient and the remaining fraction is impatient. A patient customer will wait up to some fixed number of time periods for the price of the product to fall below his or her valuation at which point the customer will make a purchase. If the price does not fall below a patient customer's valuation at any time during those periods, then that customer will leave without buying. In contrast, impatient ...
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作者：Yu, Yueshan; Chen, Xin; Zhang, Fuqiang
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This paper studies a capacity management problem with upgrading. A firm needs to procure multiple classes of capacities and then allocate the capacities to satisfy multiple classes of customers that arrive over time. A general upgrading rule is considered, i. e., unmet demand can be satisfied using multistep upgrade. No replenishment is allowed and the firm has to make the allocation decisions without observing future demand. We first characterize the structure of the optimal allocation policy...
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作者：Huaman-Aguilar, Ricardo; Cadenillas, Abel
作者单位：University of Alberta; University of Alberta
摘要：Motivated by empirical facts, we develop a theoretical model for optimal currency government debt portfolio and debt payments, which allows both government debt aversion and jumps in the exchange rates. We obtain first a realistic stochastic differential equation for public debt and then solve explicitly the optimal currency debt problem. We show that higher debt aversion and jumps in the exchange rates lead to a lower proportion of optimal debt in foreign currencies. Furthermore, we show that...
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作者：Thanh Nguyen
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We analyze a noncooperative bargaining game with a general coalition structure. In each period an opportunity for a feasible coalition to form arises according to a stochastic process, and a randomly selected agent in the coalition makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other agents in the coalition. We develop a new technique based on convex programming to characterize the unique stationary equilibrium payoff of the game. We apply the framework to various settings including trading networks...
