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作者：van Ryzin, Garrett; Vulcano, Gustavo
作者单位：Columbia University; New York University; Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
摘要：We propose an expectation-maximization (EM) method to estimate customer preferences for a category of products using only sales transaction and product availability data. The demand model combines a general, rank-based discrete choice model of preferences with a Bernoulli process of customer arrivals over time. The discrete choice model is defined by a probability mass function (pmf) on a given set of preference rankings of alternatives, including the no-purchase alternative. Each customer is ...
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作者：Ales, Laurence; Cho, Soo-Haeng; Korpeoglu, Ersin
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of London; University College London
摘要：In an innovation tournament, an organizer solicits innovative ideas from a number of independent agents. Agents exert effort to develop their solutions, but their outcomes are unknown due to technical uncertainty and/or subjective evaluation criteria. To incentivize agents to make their best effort, the organizer needs to devise a proper award scheme. While extant literature either assumes a winner-take-all scheme a priori or shows its optimality under specific distributions for uncertainty, t...
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作者：Baucells, Manel; Osadchiy, Nikolay; Ovchinnikov, Anton
作者单位：University of Virginia; Emory University; Queens University - Canada
摘要：The decision to buy an item at a regular price or wait for a possible markdown involves a multidimensional trade-off between the value of the item, the delay in getting it, the likelihood of getting it, and the magnitude of the price discount. Such trade-offs are prone to behavioral anomalies by which human decision makers deviate from the discounted expected utility model. We build an axiomatic preference model that accounts for three well-known anomalies and produces a parsimonious generaliz...
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作者：Anderson, Ross; Ashlagi, Itai; Gamarnik, David; Kanoria, Yash
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Columbia University
摘要：We study dynamic matching policies in a stochastic marketplace for barter, with agents arriving over time. Each agent is endowed with an item and is interested in an item possessed by another agent homogeneously with probability p, independently for all pairs of agents. Three settings are considered with respect to the types of allowed exchanges: (a) only two-way cycles, in which two agents swap Items, (b) two-way or three-way cycles, (c) (unbounded) chains initiated by an agent who provides a...
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作者：Birge, John R.; Hortacsu, Ali; Pavlin, J. Michael
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Chicago; Wilfrid Laurier University
摘要：We propose an inverse optimization-based methodology to determine market structure from commodity and transportation prices. The methods are appropriate for locational marginal price-based electricity markets where prices are shadow prices in the centralized optimization used to clear the market. We apply the inverse optimization methodology to outcome data from the Midcontinent ISO electricity market (MISO) and, under noise-free assumptions, recover parameters of transmission and related cons...
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作者：Zavala, Victor M.; Kim, Kibaek; Anitescu, Mihai; Birge, John
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; United States Department of Energy (DOE); Argonne National Laboratory; University of Chicago
摘要：We argue that deterministic market clearing formulations introduce arbitrary distortions between day-ahead and expected real-time prices that bias economic incentives. We extend and analyze a previously proposed stochastic clearing formulation in which the social surplus function induces penalties between day-ahead and real-time quantities. We prove that the formulation yields price bounded price distortions, and we show that adding a similar penalty term to transmission flows and phase angles...
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作者：Raghunathan, Srinivasan; Tang, Christopher S.; Yue, Xiaohang
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
摘要：The bullwhip effect has been extensively studied primarily based on the analysis of various single-product models with a few exceptions. We extend the single-product analysis to the multiproduct setting of interdependent demand streams with auto-correlation and cross-product correlation, as well as contemporaneous correlation across forecasting errors. We find that interdependency between demand streams plays a critical role in determining the existence and magnitude of the bullwhip effect. Sp...
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作者：He, Xue Dong; Hu, Sang; Obloj, Jan; Zhou, Xun Yu
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Columbia University
摘要：We consider the dynamic casino gambling model initially proposed by Barberis (2012) and study the optimal stopping strategy of a precommitting gambler with cumulative prospect theory (CPT) preferences. We illustrate how the strategies computed in Barberis (2012) [ Barberis N (2012) A model of casino gambling. Management Sci. 58(1): 35-51.] can be strictly improved by reviewing the betting history or by tossing an independent coin, andwe explain that the improvement generated by using randomize...
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作者：Adler, Ilan; Cao, Yang; Karp, Richard; Pekoz, Erol A.; Ross, Sheldon M.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Southern California; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston University
摘要：We consider a random knockout tournament among players 1,...,n, in which each match involves two players. The match format is specified by the number of matches played in each round, where the constitution of the matches in a round is random. Supposing that there are numbers v(1),...,v(n) such that a match between i and j will be won by i with probability v(i)/(v(i) + v(j)), we obtain a lower bound on the tournament win probability for the best player, as well as upper and lower bounds for all...
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作者：Belloni, Alexandre; Deng, Changrong; Pekec, Sasa
作者单位：Duke University; Analysis Group Inc.
摘要：A revenue-maximizing monopolist is selling a single indivisible good to buyers who face a loss if any of its rival buyers obtain it. The rivalry is modeled through a network, an arc between a pair of buyers indicates that a buyer considers another buyer its rival, and the magnitude of the loss is the private information of each buyer. This loss-exposure due to competitive considerations can be viewed as a negative externality. First, using a Myersonian approach we derive the monopolist's optim...
