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作者：Gretschko, Vitali; Pollrich, Martin
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Bonn
摘要：We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. We distinguish between complete contracts conditioning on all future realizations of the state of the world and incomplete contracts renegotiated whenever the state of the world changes. We provide conditions such that incomplete contracting does not pose a problem. If the changing state of the world is publicly observable and t...
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作者：Dimmock, Stephen G.; Huang, Jiekun; Weisbenner, Scott J.
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study how access to high-skill labor affects the outcomes of start-up firms. We obtain exogenous variation in firms' ability to access skilled labor by using win rates in H-1B visa lotteries. Relative to other firms that also applied for H-1B visas, firms with higher lottery win rates are more likely to receive additional venture capital funding and to have a successful exit via an IPO or acquisition. H-1B visa lottery winners also subsequently receive more patents and patent citations. Ove...
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作者：Althuizen, Niek; Chen, Bo
作者单位：Montpellier Business School; Universite de Montpellier; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：When soliciting novel product ideas from the crowd, companies may opt to show a prototype in order to steer the generation of ideas in the desired direction. On the one hand, the more features the prototype incorporates, the larger the potential for activating relevant knowledge in memory that may serve as a basis for generating novel ideas. On the other hand, it increases the risk of fixation on the incorporated features, which may inhibit the generation of novel ideas. Based on the dual path...
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作者：Ciocan, Dragos Florin; Misic, Velibor V.
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Optimal stopping is the problem of deciding when to stop a stochastic system to obtain the greatest reward, arising in numerous application areas such as finance, healthcare, and marketing. State-of-the-art methods for high-dimensional optimal stopping involve approximating the value function or the continuation value and then using that approximation within a greedy policy. Although such policies can perform very well, they are generally not guaranteed to be interpretable; that is, a decision...
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作者：Martel, Jordan; Van Wesep, Edward Dickersin; Van Wesep, Robert
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：Researchers have often attributed discrete messages such as ratings to a difference in preferences between sender and receiver. By extending a standard model of information transmission, we show that discreteness can also arise when preferences are identical but misinterpretation is possible. Whereas discrete messages are less precise, they are easier to interpret. We provide predictions for the distribution of ratings. If we believe that an observed distribution results from cooperative behav...
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作者：Ellingsen, Tore; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We propose a model of how the retention motive shapes managerial compensation contracts. Once employed, a risk-averse manager acquires imperfectly portable skills whose value is stochastic because of industry-wide demand shocks. The manager's actions are uncontractible, and the perceived fairness of the compensation contract affects the manager's motivation. If the volatility of profits is sufficiently large and outside offers are suffi-ciently likely, the equilibrium contract combines a salar...
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作者：Zhang, Chenglong; Chen, Jianqing; Raghunathan, Srinivasan
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We examine competition between two-sided platforms in a sharing economy. In sharing economies, workers self-schedule their supply based on the wage they receive. The platforms compete for workers as well as consumers. To attract workers, platforms use diverse wage schemes, including fixed commission rate, dynamic commission rate, and fixed wage. We develop a model to examine the impacts of the self-scheduled nature of the supply on competing platforms and the role of the wage scheme in the pla...
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作者：Soll, Jack B.; Palley, Asa B.; Rader, Christina A.
作者单位：Duke University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Colorado College
摘要：Much research on advice taking examines how people revise point estimates given input from others. This work has established that people often egocentrically discount advice. If they were to place more weight on advice, their point estimates would be more accurate. Yet the focus on point estimates and accuracy has resulted in a narrow conception of what it means to heed advice. We distinguish between revisions of point estimates and revisions of attendant probability distributions. Point estim...
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作者：El Hajj, Hussein; Bish, Douglas R.; Bish, Ebru K.; Kay, Denise M.
作者单位：University of Waterloo; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; Wadsworth Center
摘要：Newborn screening (NBS) is a state-level initiative that detects life-threatening genetic disorders for which early treatment can substantially improve health outcomes. Cystic fibrosis (CF) is among the most prevalent disorders in NBS. CF can be caused by a large number of mutation variants to the CFTR gene. Most states use a multitest CF screening process that includes a genetic test (DNA). However, due to cost concerns, DNA is used only on a small subset of newborns (based on a low-cost biom...
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作者：Chod, Jiri; Trichakis, Nikolaos; Yang, S. Alex
作者单位：Boston College; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of London; London Business School
摘要：This paper highlights two channels through which blockchain-enabled tokenization can alleviate moral hazard frictions between founders, investors, and users of a platform: token financing and decentralized governance. We consider an entrepreneur who uses outside financing and exerts private effort to build a platform and users who decide whether to join in response to the platform's dynamic transaction fee policy. We first show that raising capital by issuing tokens rather than equity mitigate...
