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作者：Jiang, Jiashuo; Ma, Will; Zhang, Jiawei
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Columbia University; New York University
摘要：We study the classic network revenue management (NRM) problem with accept/ reject decisions and T independent and identically distributed arrivals. We consider a distributional form in which each arrival must fall under a finite number of possible categories, each with a deterministic resource consumption vector, but a random value distributed continuously over an interval. We develop an online algorithm that achieves O(log2 T) regret under this model with the only (necessary) assumption being...
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作者：W., Martijn; Borm, Peter; Kort, Peter M.
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：This article may be used only for the purposes of research, teaching, and/or private study. Commercial use or systematic downloading (by robots or other automatic processes) is prohibited without explicit Publisher approval, unless otherwise noted. For more information, contact permissions@informs.org. The Publisher does not warrant or guarantee the article's accuracy, completeness, merchantability, fitness inclusion of an advertisement in this article, neither constitutes nor implies a guaran...
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作者：Banerjee, Imon; Honnappa, Harsha; Rao, Vinayak
作者单位：Northwestern University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：In this work, we study a natural nonparametric estimator of the transition probability matrices of a finite controlled Markov chain. We consider an off-line setting with a fixed data set of size m, collected using a so-called logging policy. We develop sample complexity bounds for the estimator and establish conditions for minimaxity. Our statistical bounds depend on the logging policy through its mixing properties. We show that achieving a particular statistical risk bound involves a subtle a...
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作者：Sun, Hailong; Li, Xiaobo; Teo, Chung-Piaw
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：Product bundling is a widely used selling strategy among multiproduct firms, yet designing and pricing bundles optimally remain a complex challenge. This paper addresses this fundamental issue by exploring the selection and pricing of a single bundle from a range of products. For instance, in the single bundle with the rest (SBR) framework, the bundle is optimally chosen and priced, whereas the remaining products are offered individually, collectively maximizing profit. We show that the SBR op...
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作者：Shen, Haoming; Jiang, Ruiwei
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Chance constraints yield nonconvex feasible regions in general. In particular, when the uncertain parameters are modeled by a Wasserstein ball, existing studies showed that the distributionally robust (pessimistic) chance constraint admits a mixed-integer conic representation. This paper identifies sufficient conditions that lead to convex feasible regions of chance constraints with Wasserstein ambiguity. First, when uncertainty arises from the right-hand side of a pessimistic joint chance con...
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作者：Balkanski, Eric; Garimidi, Pranav; Gkatzelis, Vasilis; Schoepflin, Daniel; Tan, Xizhi
作者单位：Columbia University; Drexel University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategy-proof budget-feasible procurement auctions have been proposed, aiming to maximize the value of the buyer while eliciting each seller's true cost for providing their service. Our main result in this paper is a novel method for designing budget-feasible auctions, lead...
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作者：Bai, Yicheng; El Housni, Omar; Rusmevichientong, Paat; Topaloglu, Huseyin
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：We study a joint inventory stocking and assortment customization problem. We have access to a set of products that can be used to stock a storage facility with limited capacity. At the beginning of the selling horizon, we decide how many units of each product to stock. Customers of different types with type-dependent preferences for the products arrive over the selling horizon. Depending on the remaining product inventories and the type of the customer, we offer a product assortment to the arr...
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作者：Feldman, Michal; Gkatzelis, Vasilis; Gravin, Nick; Schoepflin, Daniel
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Drexel University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell some service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer i has a private value vi for receiving this service, but a feasibility constraint restricts which buyers can be simultaneously served. Recent work in economics introduced (deferred-acceptance) clock auctions as a superior class of auctions for this problem due to their transparency, simplicity, and strong incentive guarantees. Subsequent work focused on evaluati...
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作者：Chen, Xi; Simchi-Levi, David; Zhao, Zishuo; Zhou, Yuan
作者单位：New York University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Tsinghua University; Tsinghua University
摘要：In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both nonzero miner revenue and Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC) for users. However, a positive miner revenue is important in practice to motivate miners. To address this challenge, we consider a Bayesian game setting and relax the DSIC requirement for us...
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作者：Wang, Hanzhao; Talluri, Kalyan; Li, Xiaocheng
作者单位：Imperial College London
摘要：We consider dynamic pricing with covariates under a generalized linear demand model: A seller can dynamically adjust the price of a product over a horizon of T time periods, and at each time period t, the demand of the product is jointly determined by the price and an observable covariate vector xt is an element of Rd through a generalized linear model with unknown coefficients. Most of the existing literature assumes the covariate vectors xts are independently and identically distributed (i.i...
