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作者：Federgruen, Awi; Hu, Ming
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Toronto
摘要：We analyze a general but parsimonious price competition model for an oligopoly in which each firm offers any number of products. The demand volumes are general piecewise affine functions of the full price vector, generated as the regular extension of a base set of affine functions. The model specifies a product assortment, along with their prices and demand volumes, in contrast to most commonly used demand models, such as the multinomial logit model or any of its variants. We show that a speci...
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作者：Chen, Yiwei; Trichakis, Nikolaos
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Consider a network revenue management model in which a seller offers multiple products, which consume capacitated resources. The seller uses an anonymous posted-price policy, and arriving customers strategize on (a) when and (b) which product to purchase to maximize their utility, based on heterogeneous product valuations. Such models, whereby customers are both forward looking and choose what to buy, have not yet been amenable to analysis, mainly because their associated dynamic mechanism des...
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作者：Eden, Alon; Feldman, Michal; Friedler, Ophir; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Weinberg, S. Matthew
作者单位：Harvard University; Tel Aviv University; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Princeton University
摘要：We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with m heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation for the items may exhibit both substitutes and complements. We show that the better of selling the items separately and bundling them together-guarantees a Theta(d)-fraction of the optimal revenue, where d is a measure of the degree of complementarity; it extends prior work showing that the same simple mechanism achieves a constant-factor approximation when buyer valuations are subadditive (th...
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作者：Ma, Will; Simchi-Levi, David; Teo, Chung-Piaw
作者单位：Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National University of Singapore
摘要：In this paper, we study the single-item revenue management problem, with no information given about the demand trajectory over time. When the item is sold through accepting/rejecting different fare classes, the tight competitive ratio for this problem has been established by Ball and Queyranne through booking limit policies, which raise the acceptance threshold as the remaining inventory dwindles. However, when the item is sold through dynamic pricing instead, there is the additional challenge...
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作者：Ciocan, Dragos Florin; Iyer, Krishnamurthy
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We consider an ad network's problem of allocating the auction for each individual impression to an optimal subset of advertisers with the goal of revenue maximization. This is a variant of bipartite matching except that advertisers may strategize by choosing their bidding profiles and their total budget. Because the ad network's allocation rule affects the bidders' strategies, equilibrium analysis is challenging. We show that this analysis is tractable when advertisers face a linear budget cos...
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作者：Araman, Victor F.; Fayad, Bassam
作者单位：American University of Beirut; Sorbonne Universite; Universite Paris Cite
摘要：A firm that sells a nonperishable product considers intertemporal price discrimination in the objective of maximizing its long-run average revenue. We consider a general model of patient customers with changing valuations. Arriving customers wait for a random but bounded length of time and purchase the product when its price falls below their valuation, which varies following a stochastic process. We show the optimality of a class of cyclic strategies and obtain an algorithm that yields them. ...
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作者：Ross, Sheldon M.; Weiss, Gideon; Zhang, Zhengyu
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Haifa
摘要：Consider n initially empty boxes, numbered 1 through n. Balls arrive sequentially. Each ball has a binary n-vector attached to it, with the interpretation that the ball is eligible to be put in box i if component i of its vector is equal to 1. An arriving ball can be put in any empty box for which it is eligible. Assuming that components of the vector are independent Bernoulli random variables with initially unknown probabilities, our primary interest is to compare several policies to determin...
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作者：Russo, Daniel
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：This note gives a short, self-contained proof of a sharp connection between Gittins indices and Bayesian upper confidence bound algorithms. I consider a Gaussian multiarmed bandit problem with discount factor.. The Gittins index of an arm is shown to equal the gamma-quantile of the posterior distribution of the arm's mean plus an error term that vanishes as gamma -> 1. In this sense, for sufficiently patient agents, a Gittins index measures the highest plausible mean-reward of an arm in a mann...
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作者：Chen, Xi; He, Simai; Jiang, Bo; Ryan, Christopher Thomas; Zhang, Teng
作者单位：New York University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of British Columbia; Stanford University
摘要：The discrete moment problem is a foundational problem in distribution-free robust optimization, where the goal is to find a worst-case distribution that satisfies a given set of moments. This paper studies the discrete moment problems with additional shape constraints that guarantee the worst-case distribution is either log-concave (LC), has an increasing failure rate (IFR), or increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR). These classes of shape constraints have not previously been studied in th...
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作者：Golrezaei, Negin; Javanmard, Adel; Mirrokni, Vahab
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Southern California; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：Motivated by pricing in ad exchange markets, we consider the problem of robust learning of reserve prices against strategic buyers in repeated contextual second-price auctions. Buyers' valuations for an item depend on the context that describes the item. However, the seller is not aware of the relationship between the context and buyers' valuations (i.e., buyers' preferences). The seller's goal is to design a learning policy to set reserve prices via observing the past sales data, and her obje...
