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作者：Bekkerman, Ron; Cohen, Maxime C.; Liu, Xiaoyan; Maiden, John; Mitrofanov, Dmitry
作者单位：McGill University; Santa Clara University; Boston College
摘要：Problem definition: : Opportunity zones (OZs) are designated census tracts in which real estate investments can gain tax benefits. Introduced by the U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, the goal of the OZ program is to foster economic development in distressed neighborhoods. In this paper, we investigate and optimize the OZ selection process and examine the impact of OZs by exploiting two data sets: a proprietary real estate data set that includes 36.1 million residential transactions spanning ...
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作者：Rios, Ignacio; Ghosh, Pramit
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：Problem definition: : We study settings where agents sequentially search among different options under competition. Motivated by labor markets and the allocation of kidneys from deceased donors, we focus on the effect of (i) the mechanism to collect decisions, that is, whether all agents make their decisions simultaneously or sequentially, and (ii) competition, that is, the number of agents who are searching from a shared pool of options. Methodology/results: : We introduce a model of sequenti...
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作者：Zhang, Yinghao; Yu, Peiwen; Feng, Tianjun
作者单位：University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati; Chongqing University; Fudan University
摘要：Problem definition: Despite extensive research on buyback contracts in supply chain management, little attention has been given to a direct comparison between a traditional full-quantity, partial-credit (FQ) buyback contract and an alternative full-credit, partial-quantity (FC) contract, especially when considering the behavioral biases of the retailer. This study aims to fill this research gap by exploring how these biases influence contract performance and offer practical guidelines for supp...
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作者：Ninh, Anh; Shen, Zuo-. Tun Max
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Problem definition: Min-max or max-min objective criteria naturally arise in many resource allocation applications, especially when the attendant goal involves distribution of a limited resource across multiple subsystems, locations, or activities. Each has a different consumption rate of the resource. In this setting, the decision maker is interested in optimizing the system performance, which can be measured in terms of the smallest or largest order statistic across subsystems. Examples incl...
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作者：Bakshi, Nitin; Mohan, Shyam
摘要：Problem definition: : Shocks that trigger supply chain disruptions inflict initial losses by damaging firms' assets. The disruption can then cascade when an affected firm fails to deliver to its buyer, thereby interrupting the buyer's operations, and continue thus across multiple levels (tiers) in the supply chain. To protect against such disruption cascades, firms can make ex ante investments in risk mitigation. These investments depend heavily on the operational characteristics of network pa...
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作者：Song, Haotian; Lai, Guoming; Xiao, Wenqiang
作者单位：Zhejiang University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; New York University
摘要：Problem definition: We investigate the optimal salesforce compensation scheme in the context of private information and unobservable actions, considering common operational factors encountered in practice, including inventory costs, contractible versus censored demand information, and controlled versus delegated ordering. Methodology/ +results: Based on an agency model with general demand and cost functions, we derive optimality conditions for implementable contracts that can achieve the secon...
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作者：Song, Haotian; Lai, Guoming; Xiao, Wenqiang
作者单位：Zhejiang University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; New York University
摘要：Problem definition: : We investigate the optimal salesforce compensation scheme in the context of private information and unobservable actions, considering common operational factors encountered in practice, including inventory costs, contractible versus censored demand information, and controlled versus delegated ordering. Methodology/ results: : Based on an agency model with general demand and cost functions, we derive optimality conditions for implementable contracts that can achieve the se...
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作者：Basciftci, Beste; Ahmed, Shabbir; Gebraeel, Nagi
作者单位：University of Iowa; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：Problem definition: : Multistage stochastic programming is a well-established framework for sequential decision making under uncertainty by seeking policies that can be dynamically adjusted as uncertainty is realized. Often, for example, because of contractual constraints, such flexible policies are not desirable, and the decision maker may need to commit to a set of actions for a certain number of periods. Two-stage stochastic programming might be better suited to such settings, where first-s...
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作者：Carlsson, John Gunnar; Peng, Xiaoshan; Ryzhov, Ilya O.
作者单位：University of Southern California; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Problem definition: : A service is offered at certain locations (facilities) in a geographical region. Customers can appear anywhere in the region, and each customer chooses a facility based on travel distance as well as expected waiting time. Customer decisions affect waiting times by increasing the load on a facility, and thus, they impact other customers' decisions. The service provider can also influence service quality by adjusting service rates at each facility. Methodology/results: : Us...
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作者：Shan, Xi; Ye, Lixin; Zhang, Chenglin
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; SUNY Plattsburgh; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要：Problem definition : We consider contract confidentiality in a decentralized supply chain, in which a single principal orders different components from different agents, each of which has private cost information. The principal may commit to publicly observed bilateral contracts or offer secretly observed contracts to each agent simultaneously. We also consider the problem of sequential contracting. Methodology/results : By correcting the main analysis in Hu and Qi [Hu B, Qi A (2018) Optimal p...
