-
作者：Debo, Laurens G.; Snitkovsky, Ran I.
作者单位：Dartmouth College; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Tipping is a complex phenomenon cutting across various stakeholders-firms, customers, and workers. Analyzing the long-run impact of policies related to tipping is therefore challenging. To facilitate such analysis, we develop a modeling framework in which a tipping norm forms endogenously in a market consisting of a firm that offers service to potential customers. Customers choose whether to consume the service or not and, if yes, how much to tip the server afterward. With tipping, customers s...
-
作者：Ashraf, Anik
作者单位：University of Munich
摘要：Performance ranking can trigger multiple social incentives for workers. On one hand, it offers status rewards to induce them to increase effort. On the other, better-ranked workers may reduce effort to conform to coworkers' productivity in fear of social retribution. This paper uses a field experiment in a sweater factory to disentangle the incentives underlying performance ranks. Treated workers receive ranks either privately or publicly. I find that private ranks do not have any effect on av...
-
作者：Cont, Rama; Cucuringu, Mihai; Xu, Renyuan; Zhang, Chao
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Oxford; New York University; New York University Tandon School of Engineering; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (Guangzhou)
摘要：The estimation of loss distributions for dynamic portfolios requires the simulation of scenarios representing realistic joint dynamics of their components. We propose a novel data-driven approach for simulating realistic, high-dimensional multiasset scenarios, focusing on accurately representing tail risk for a class of static and dynamic trading strategies. We exploit the joint elicitability property of Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall to design a Generative Adversarial Network that learn...
-
作者：Belenzon, Sharon; Cioaca, Larisa
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tulane University
摘要：The U.S. government incentivizes firms to develop innovative technologies by awarding research and development (R&D) contracts that often carry an implicit promise of guaranteed demand. Firms that demonstrate strong technological capabilities are rewarded with noncompetitive production contracts for the resulting products and services. Using newly assembled data on $4.2 trillion in government procurement contracts from all federal agencies, matched to U.S. publicly traded firms, we document a ...
-
作者：Guo, Cheng; Bodur, Merve; Taylor, Joshua A.
作者单位：Clemson University; University of Edinburgh; University of Edinburgh; Heriot Watt University; New Jersey Institute of Technology
摘要：Optimization problems with discrete decisions are nonconvex and thus lack strong duality, which limits the usefulness of tools such as shadow prices. It was shown in Burer (2009) that mixed-binary quadratic programs can be written as completely positive programs, which are convex. We apply this perspective by writing unit commitment in power systems as a completely positive program and then using the dual copositive program and strong duality to design new pricing mechanisms. We show that the ...
-
作者：Lu, Tao; Tomlin, Brian
作者单位：University of Connecticut; Dartmouth College
摘要：A canonical setting in supply chain research is one in which a retailer sources a product, under a wholesale price contract, from a manufacturer that invests in capacity in advance of the retailer's order. When the retailer possesses private information about demand, it is well understood that credible cheap-talk communication is not possible absent considerations of trust or the reactive setting of the wholesale price. This understanding is based on the practice of demand information being sh...
-
作者：Schwab, Stephen D.
作者单位：University of Texas at San Antonio; University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio
摘要：When a member of a work team leaves, some knowledge is lost to the organization. Exploiting quasi-random turnover among military physicians because of deployments, I estimate the effects of turnover on patients and other providers in the same care team. I find that a discontinuity in primary care leads to a 3%-5% increase in costs driven primarily by an increase in the use and intensity of specialty care with no observable benefit to the patient as measured by potential reductions in hospitali...
-
作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Kim, Kyungmin; Mukherjee, Arijit
作者单位：Michigan State University; Yonsei University; Emory University
摘要：Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers' data to develop competing products, but the threat of future competition can deter sellers' entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform's entry on the marketplace and the referral fee it charges to the third-party sellers. We first characterize the platform's optimal fee under different degrees of commitment on its own entry policy. We show that full commitment maximizes not only the platform's payoff but also consumer su...
-
作者：Han, Eojin; Nohadani, Omid
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：Sequential decision making often requires dynamic policies, which are computationally not tractable in general. Decision rules provide approximate solutions by restricting decisions to simple functions of uncertainties. In this paper, we consider a nonparametric lifting framework where the uncertainty space is lifted to higher dimensions to obtain nonlinear decision rules. Current lifting-based approaches require predetermined functions and are parametric. We propose two nonparametric liftings...
-
作者：Bapna, Sofia; Funk, Russell J.
作者单位：University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：This article may be used only for the purposes of research, teaching, and/or private study. Commercial use or systematic downloading (by robots or other automatic processes) is prohibited without explicit Publisher approval, unless otherwise noted. For more information, contact permissions@informs.org. The Publisher does not warrant or guarantee the article's accuracy, completeness, merchantability, fitness inclusion of an advertisement in this article, neither constitutes nor implies a guaran...
