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作者：Kalvenes, Joakim; Basu, Amit
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：Firms that set up electronic marketplaces to enhance their supply and/or distribution channels face challenges in attracting their competitors to participate. A major obstacle is the perception that the owner can unfairly exploit trading information for competitive advantage. In this paper, we propose a marketplace design that shifts the locus of control over trader privacy from the marketplace operator to each individual trader. We show how online transactions between trading partners can be ...
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作者：Kadane, Joseph B.; Krishnan, Ramayya; Shmueli, Galit
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Carnegie Mellon University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Count data arise in various organizational settings. When the release of such data is sensitive, organizations need information-disclosure policies that protect data confidentiality while still providing data access. In contrast to extant disclosure policies, we describe a new policy for count tables that is based on disclosing only the sufficient statistics of a flexible discrete distribution. This distribution, the COM-Poisson, well approximates Poisson counts but also under- and over-disper...
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作者：Ozer, Ozalp; Wei, Wei
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study the important problem of how to assure credible forecast information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer. The supplier is responsible for acquiring the necessary capacity before receiving an order from the manufacturer who possesses private forecast information for her end product. We address how different contracts affect the supplier's capacity decision and, hence, the profitability of the supplier and the manufacturer. We fully develop two contracts (and provide explicit ...
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作者：Franke, G; Schlesinger, H; Stapleton, RC
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Manchester
摘要：Although there has been much attention in recent years on the effects of additive background risks, the same is not true for its multiplicative counterpart. We consider random wealth of the multiplicative form i, where i and P are statistically independent random variables. We assume that x is endogenous to the economic agent but that P is an exogenous and nontraclable background risk that represents a type of market incompleteness. Our main focus is on how the presence of the multiplicative b...
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作者：Bolton, Ruth N.; Lemon, Katherine N.; Bramlett, Matthew D.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Groningen; Boston College; Centers for Disease Control & Prevention - USA; CDC National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS)
摘要：This paper examines the link between a supplier's marketing and service operations and its business customers' subsequent repatronage behavior. We develop a dynamic model of service contract renewal for an individual firm, at the contract level, recognizing interdependencies among service contract renewal decisions due to the firm's purchase of multiple contracts from the same supplier. The decision to renew a service contract is modeled as a function of service quality and price, where servic...
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作者：Andrade, Rafael; Lisser, Abdel; Maculan, Nelson; Plateau, Gerard
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay; Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro; Universite Paris 13
摘要：In this paper we present branch-and-bound (B&B) strategies for two-stage stochastic integer network design-based models with integrality constraints in the first-stage variables. These strategies are used within L-shaped decomposition-based B&B framework. We propose a valid inequality in order to improve B&B performance. We use this inequality to implement a multirooted B&B tree. A selective use of optimality cuts is explored in the B&B approach and we also propose a subgradient-based techniqu...
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作者：Menon, Tanya; Thompson, Leigh; Choi, Hoon-Seok
作者单位：University of Chicago; Northwestern University; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：We compare how people react to good ideas authored by internal rivals (employees at the same organization) versus external rivals (employees at a competitor organization). We hypothesize that internal and external rivals evoke contrasting kinds of threats. Specifically, using knowledge from an internal rival is difficult because it threatens the self and its competence: It is tantamount to being a follower and losing status relative to a direct competitor. By contrast, external rivals pose a l...
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作者：Kulatilaka, Nalin; Lin, Lihui
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：Technology innovations continue to be one of the greatest drivers of economic growth. Realizing the value of such innovations, however, requires substantial follow-on investments in development and commercialization. The value of these investments is difficult to capture because of uncertain demand and potential competition. This often leads to difficulties in obtaining outside financing for these investments. In this paper, we explore how licensing contracts can both dissuade other firms from...
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作者：Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon; Ghemawat, Pankaj
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper analyzes a dynamic mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing competitor interacts with a competitor that prices at zero (or marginal cost), with the cumulation of output affecting their relative positions over time. The modeling effort is motivated by interactions between Linux, an open source operating system, and Microsoft's Windows and consequently emphasizes demand-side learning effects that generate dynamic scale economies (or network externalities). Analytical characterizatio...
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作者：Cachon, Gerard P.; Zhang, Fuqiang
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：This paper studies a queuing model in which a buyer sources a good or service from a single supplier chosen from a pool of suppliers. The buyer seeks to minimize the sum of her procurement and operating costs, the latter of which depends on the supplier's lead time. The selected supplier can regulate his lead time, but faster lead times are costly. Although the buyer selects the supplier to source from (possibly via an auction) and dictates the contractual terms, the buyer's bargaining power i...
