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作者：Cappelen, Alexander W.; Moene, Karl O.; Sorensen, Erik O.; Tungodden, Bertil
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：What is the relative importance of needs, entitlements, and nationality in people's social preferences? To study this question, we conducted a real-effort dictator experiment where students in two of the world's richest countries, Norway and Germany, were matched directly with students in two of the world's poorest countries, Uganda and Tanzania. The experimental design made the participants face distributive situations where different moral motives came into play, and based on the observed be...
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作者：Benjamin, Daniel J.; Brown, Sebastian A.; Shapiro, Jesse M.
作者单位：Cornell University; Barclays; University of Chicago
摘要：In this paper, we ask whether variation in preference anomalies is related to variation in cognitive ability. Evidence from a new laboratory study of Chilean high-school students with similar schooling backgrounds shows that small-stakes risk aversion and short-run discounting are less common among those with higher standardized test scores. The relationship with test scores survives controls for parental education and wealth. We find some evidence that elementary-school GPA is predictive of p...
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作者：Finkelstein, Amy; Luttmer, Erzo F. P.; Notowidigdo, Matthew J.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Dartmouth College; University of Chicago
摘要：We estimate how the marginal utility of consumption varies with health. To do so, we develop a simple model in which the impact of health on the marginal utility of consumption can be estimated from data on permanent income, health, and utility proxies. We estimate the model using the Health and Retirement Study's panel data on the elderly and near-elderly, and proxy for utility with measures of subjective well-being. Across a wide range of alternative specifications and assumptions, we find t...
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作者：Moen, Espen R.; Rosen, Asa
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on-the-job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on-the-job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on-the-job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker-firm pair of on-the-job search is high. Moreov...
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作者：Ireland, Peter N.
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：This paper estimates, using data from the United States and the Euro Area, a two-country stochastic growth model in which both neutral and investment-specific technology shocks are nonstationary but cointegrated across economies. The results point to large and persistent swings in productivity, both favorable and adverse, originating in the United States but not transmitted to the Euro Area. More specifically, the results suggest that while the Euro Area missed out on the period of rapid inves...
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作者：Caselli, Francesco; Coleman, Wilbur John, II
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Duke University
摘要：When considering engaging in conflict to secure control of a resource, a group needs to predict the amount of post-conflict leakage due to infiltration by members of losing groups. We use this insight to explain why conflict often takes place along ethnic lines, why some ethnic groups are more often in conflict than others (and some never are), and why the same groups are sometimes in conflict and sometimes at peace. In our theory ethnic markers help enforce group membership: in homogeneous so...
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作者：Koning, Pierre; van der Wiel, Karen
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：This paper analyzes whether information about the quality of high schools published in a national newspaper affects school choice in the Netherlands. We find that negative (positive) school-quality scores decrease (increase) the number of first-year students who choose a school after the year of publication. These effects are only large for the college-preparatory track, such that a school receiving the most positive score for its most academic track sees 1618 more first-year students enroll. ...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.; Santos, Rafael J.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; Yale University
摘要：Many states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia lack the monopoly of violence, even though this was identified by Max Weber as the foundation of the state, and thus the capacity to govern effectively. In this paper we develop a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence. We build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate nonstate armed actors (paramilitaries) in a democracy. The model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can i...
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作者：Debortoli, Davide; Nunes, Ricardo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Abstract The tendency of countries to accumulate public debt has been rationalized in models of political disagreement and lack of commitment. We analyze in a benchmark model how the evolution of public debt is affected by lack of commitment per se. While commitment introduces indeterminacy in the level of debt, lack of commitment creates incentives for debt to converge to specific levels. One of the levels that debt often converges to implies no debt accumulation at all. In a simple example w...
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作者：Alesina, Alberto F.; Lotti, Francesca; Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio
作者单位：Harvard University; Bocconi University; European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
摘要：By using a unique and large data set on loan contracts between banks and microfirms, we find robust evidence that women in Italy pay more for credit than men, although we do not find any evidence that women borrowers are riskier than men. The male/female differential remains even after controlling for a large number of characteristics of the type of business, the borrower, and the structure of the credit market. The result is not driven by lack of credit history, nor by women using a different...
