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作者：Bradley, Jake; Postel-Vinay, Fabien; Turon, Helene
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of London; University College London; University of Bristol
摘要：We develop and estimate a structural model that incorporates a sizeable public sector in a labor market with search frictions. The wage distribution and the employment rate in the public sector are taken as exogenous policy parameters. Overall wage distribution and employment rate are determined within the model, taking into account the private sector's endogenous response to public sector employment policies. Job turnover is sector specific and transitions between sectors depend on the worker...
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作者：Choi, Syngjoo; Galeotti, Andrea; Goyal, Sanjeev
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); European University Institute; University of Essex; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
摘要：We propose a model of posted prices in networks. The model maps traditional concepts of market power, competition, and double marginalization into networks, allowing for the study of pricing in complex structures of intermediation, such as supply chains, transportation and communication networks, and financial brokerage. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium prices. Our experiments complement our theoretical work and point to node criticality as an organizing principle for unde...
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作者：Peitz, Martin; Rady, Sven; Trepper, Piers
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Bonn; University of Munich
摘要：We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market. The platform provider is uncertain about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. Setting participation fees on both sides, it gradually learns about these externalities by observing actual participation levels. This provides an informational rationale for introductory pricing, with the platform provider charging a fee below the myopically optimal level on at least one side of the mark...
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作者：Setty, Ofer
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Unemployment accounts are mandatory individual savings accounts that can be used only during unemployment or retirement. Unlike unemployment insurance, unemployment accounts solve the moral hazard problem but provide no public insurance to workers. I study a hybrid system that borrows from concepts of both unemployment insurance and unemployment accounts, in which workers are mandated to save when employed and can withdraw from the account when unemployed. Once the account is exhausted, the un...
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作者：Ghysels, Eric; Idier, Julien; Manganelli, Simone; Vergote, Olivier
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; European Central Bank; Bank of France; European Central Bank
摘要：Policy impact studies often suffer from endogeneity problems. Consider the case of the European Central Bank (ECB) Securities Markets Programme: If Eurosystem interventions were triggered by sudden and strong price deteriorations, looking at daily price changes may bias downward the correlation between yields and the amounts of bonds purchased. Simple regressions of daily changes in yields on quantities often give insignificant or even positive coefficients and therefore suggest that Securitie...
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作者：La Ferrara, Eliana
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper explores the potential use of entertainment media programs for achieving development goals. I propose a simple framework for interpreting media effects that hinges on three channels: (i) information provision, (ii) role modeling and preference change, and (iii) time use. I then review the existing evidence on how exposure to commercial television and radio affects outcomes such as fertility preferences, gender norms, education, migration, and social capital. I complement these indiv...
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作者：D'Erasmo, Pablo; Mendoza, Enrique G.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Europe's debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk-averse debt and nondebtholders. A utilitarian government cannot sustain debt if default is costless. If default is costly, debt with default risk is sustainable, and debt falls as the concentration of debt ownership rises. A government favorin...
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作者：Segal, Ilya; Whinston, Michael D.
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We show that efficient bargaining is impossible for a wide class of economic settings and property rights. These settings are characterized by (i) the existence of adverse efficient opt-out types, whose participation does not change the efficient allocation and who, when they opt out, are the worst type other agents can face, and (ii) non-existence of the marginal core, and its multivaluedness with a positive probability. We also examine the optimal allocation of property rights within a given...
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作者：Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar
作者单位：University of Chicago; Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU)
摘要：We develop a model to understand the incidence of presidential and parliamentary institutions. Our analysis is predicated on two ideas: first, that minorities are relatively powerful in a parliamentary system compared to a presidential system, and second, that presidents have more power with respect to their own coalition than prime ministers do. These assumptions imply that while presidentialism has separation of powers, it does not necessarily have more checks and balances than parliamentari...
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作者：Benczur, Peter; Ilut, Cosmin L.
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper presents direct evidence for relational contracts in sovereign bank lending. Unlike the existing empirical literature, its instrumental variables method allows for distinguishing a direct influence of past repayment problems on current spreads (a punishment effect in prices) from an indirect effect through higher expected future default probabilities (loss of reputation). Such a punishment provides positive surplus to lenders after a default and decreases the borrower's present disc...
