-
作者：Godefroy, Raphael; Perez-Richet, Eduardo
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：We study selection rules: voting procedures used by committees to choose whether to place an issue on their agenda. At the selection stage of the model, committee members are uncertain about their final preferences. They only have some private information about these preferences. We show that voters become more conservative when the selection rule itself becomes more conservative. The decision rule has the opposite effect. We compare these voting procedures to the designation of an agenda sett...
-
作者：Dovonon, Prosper; Renault, Eric
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Brown University
摘要：This paper proposes a test for common conditionally heteroskedastic (CH) features in asset returns. Following Engle and Kozicki (1993), the common CH features property is expressed in terms of testable overidentifying moment restrictions. However, as we show, these moment conditions have a degenerate Jacobian matrix at the true parameter value and therefore the standard asymptotic results of Hansen (1982) do not apply. We show in this context that Hansen's (1982) J-test statistic is asymptotic...
-
作者：Martin, Ian
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper investigates the behavior of asset prices in an endowment economy in which a representative agent with power utility consumes the dividends of multiple assets. The assets are Lucas trees; a collection of Lucas trees is a Lucas orchard. The model generates return correlations that vary endogenously, spiking at times of disaster. Since disasters spread across assets, the model generates large risk premia even for assets with stable cashflows. Very small assets may comove endogenously ...
-
作者：Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Joergen W.
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals' preferences are their private information, a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis. At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what w...
-
作者：Chaney, Eric
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Using centuries of Nile flood data, I document that during deviant Nile floods, Egypt's highest-ranking religious authority was less likely to be replaced and relative allocations to religious structures increased. These findings are consistent with historical evidence that Nile shocks increased this authority's political influence by raising the probability he could coordinate a revolt. I find that the available data provide support for this interpretation and weigh against some of the most p...
-
作者：Eyster, Erik; Piccione, Michele
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We model a dynamic, competitive market, where in every period, risk-neutral traders trade a one-period bond against an infinitely lived asset, with limited short-selling of the long-term asset. Traders lack structural knowledge and use different incomplete theories, all of which give statistically correct beliefs about next period's market price of the long-term asset. The more theories there are in the market, the higher is the equilibrium price of the long-term asset. Investors with more com...
-
作者：Carvajal, Andres; Deb, Rahul; Fenske, James; Quah, John K. -H.
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Toronto; University of Oxford
摘要：The aim of this paper is to develop revealed preference tests for Cournot equilibrium. The tests are akin to the widely used revealed preference tests for consumption, but have to take into account the presence of strategic interaction in a game-theoretic setting. The tests take the form of linear programs, the solutions to which also allow us to recover cost information on the firms. To check that these nonparametric tests are sufficiently discriminating to reject real data, we apply them to ...
-
作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University
摘要：We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions that are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. Bayes correlated equilibria. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the first and second moments of the equilibrium action-state distribution. We derive exact bounds o...
-
作者：Michalopoulos, Stelios; Papaioannou, Elias
作者单位：Brown University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We investigate the role of deeply rooted pre-colonial ethnic institutions in shaping comparative regional development within African countries. We combine information on the spatial distribution of ethnicities before colonization with regional variation in contemporary economic performance, as proxied by satellite images of light density at night. We document a strong association between pre-colonial ethnic political centralization and regional development. This pattern is not driven by differ...
-
作者：Antras, Pol; Chor, Davin
作者单位：Harvard University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We develop a property-rights model of the firm in which production entails a continuum of uniquely sequenced stages. In each stage, a final-good producer contracts with a distinct supplier for the procurement of a customized stage-specific component. Our model yields a sharp characterization for the optimal allocation of ownership rights along the value chain. We show that the incentive to integrate suppliers varies systematically with the relative position (upstream versus downstream) at whic...
