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作者：Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Angrist, Joshua; Pathak, Parag
作者单位：Duke University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Parents gauge school quality in part by the level of student achievement and a school's racial and socioeconomic mix. The importance of school characteristics in the housing market can be seen in the jump in house prices at school district boundaries where peer characteristics change. The question of whether schools with more attractive peers are really better in a value-added sense remains open, however. This paper uses a fuzzy regression-discontinuity design to evaluate the causal effects of...
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作者：Pavan, Alessandro; Segal, Ilya; Toikka, Juuso
作者单位：Northwestern University; Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study mechanism design in dynamic quasilinear environments where private information arrives over time and decisions are made over multiple periods. We make three contributions. First, we provide a necessary condition for incentive compatibility that takes the form of an envelope formula for the derivative of an agent's equilibrium expected payoff with respect to his current type. It combines the familiar marginal effect of types on payoffs with novel marginal effects of the current type on...
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作者：Allen, Treb
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：It is costly to learn about market conditions elsewhere, especially in developing countries. This paper examines how such information frictions affect trade. Using data on regional agricultural trade in the Philippines, I first document a number of observed patterns in trade flows and prices that suggest the presence of information frictions. I then incorporate information frictions into a perfect competition trade model by embedding a process whereby heterogeneous producers engage in a costly...
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作者：Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frederic; Perez-Richet, Eduardo
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information revelation. We consider Bayesian games augmented by a pre-play communication phase in which announcements are made publicly. We first characterize the augmented games in which there exists a fully revealing sequential equilibrium with extremal beliefs (i.e., any deviation is attributed to a single type of the deviator). Next, we define a class of games for which existence of a fully revealing equili...
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作者：Davis, Morris A.; Fisher, Jonas D. M.; Whited, Toni M.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; University of Rochester
摘要：Cities exist because of the productivity gains that arise from clustering production and workers, a process called agglomeration. How important is agglomeration for aggregate growth? This paper constructs a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of cities and uses it to estimate the effect of local agglomeration on aggregate growth. We combine aggregate time-series and city-level panel data to estimate the model's parameters via generalized method of moments. The estimates imply a statis...
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作者：Deck, Cary; Schlesinger, Harris
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
摘要：Risk aversion (a second-order risk preference) is a time-proven concept in economic models of choice under risk. More recently, the higher order risk preferences of prudence (third-order) and temperance (fourth-order) also have been shown to be quite important. While a majority of the population seems to exhibit both risk aversion and these higher order risk preferences, a significant minority does not. We show how both risk-averse and risk-loving behaviors might be generated by a simple type ...
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作者：Bursztyn, Leonardo; Ederer, Florian; Ferman, Bruno; Yuchtman, Noam
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Using a high-stakes field experiment conducted with a financial brokerage, we implement a novel design to separately identify two channels of social influence in financial decisions, both widely studied theoretically. When someone purchases an asset, his peers may also want to purchase it, both because they learn from his choice (social learning) and because his possession of the asset directly affects others' utility of owning the same asset (social utility). We randomize whether one member o...
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作者：Callander, Steven; Hummel, Patrick
作者单位：Stanford University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We develop a model of experimentation and learning in policymaking when control of power is temporary. We demonstrate how an early office holder who would otherwise not experiment is nonetheless induced to experiment when his hold on power is temporary. This preemptive policy experiment is profitable for the early office holder as it reveals information about the policy mapping to his successor, information that shapes future policy choices. Thus policy choices today can cast a long shadow ove...
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作者：Hinnerich, Bjorn Tyrefors; Pettersson-Lidbom, Per
作者单位：Stockholm University
摘要：In this paper, we compare how two different types of political regimes-direct versus representative democracy-redistribute income toward the relatively poor segments of society after the introduction of universal and equal suffrage. Swedish local governments are used as a testing ground since this setting offers a number of attractive features for a credible impact evaluation. Most importantly, we exploit the existence of a population threshold, which partly determined a local government's cho...
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作者：Oprea, Ryan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：Subjects in a laboratory experiment withdraw earnings from a cash reserve evolving according to an arithmetic Brownian motion in near-continuous time. Aggressive withdrawal policies expose subjects to risk of bankruptcy, but the policy that maximizes expected earnings need not maximize the odds of survival. When profit maximization is consistent with high rates of survival (HS parameters), subjects adjust decisively towards the optimum. When survival and profit maximization are sharply at odds...
