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作者：Dubois, Pierre; Jullien, Bruno; Magnac, Thierry
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE
摘要：We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions in which commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure each other through both formal contracts and informal agreements, that is, self-enforcing agreements specifying voluntary transfers. This theoretical setting nests the case of complete markets and the case where only informal agreements are available. W...
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作者：Cox, James C.; Friedman, Daniel; Sadiraj, Vjollca
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：This paper develops a nonparametric theory of preferences over one's own and others' monetary payoffs. We introduce more altruistic than (MAT), a partial ordering over such preferences, and interpret it with known parametric models. We also introduce and illustrate more generous than (MGT), a partial ordering over opportunity sets. Several recent studies focus on two-player extensive form games of complete information in which the first mover (FM) chooses a more or less generous opportunity se...
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作者：Khan, Aubhik; Thomas, Julia K.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
摘要：We study a model of lumpy investment wherein establishments face persistent shocks to common and plant-specific productivity, and nonconvex adjustment costs lead them to pursue generalized (S, s) investment rules. We allow persistent heterogeneity in both capital and total factor productivity alongside low-level investments exempt from adjustment costs to develop the first model consistent with the cross-sectional distribution of establishment investment rates. Examining the implications of lu...
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作者：Sun, Yixiao; Phillips, Peter C. B.; Jin, Sainan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Yale University; University of Auckland; University of York - UK; Peking University
摘要：This paper considers studentized tests in time series regressions with nonparametrically autocorrelated errors. The studentization is based on robust standard errors with truncation lag M=bT for some constant b is an element of(0, 1] and sample size T. It is shown that the nonstandard fixed-b limit distributions of such nonparametrically studentized tests provide more accurate approximations to the finite sample distributions than the standard small-b limit distribution. We further show that, ...
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作者：Andersen, Steffen; Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten I.; Rutstrom, E. Elisabet
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; Copenhagen Business School; State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida; Durham University
摘要：We design experiments to jointly elicit risk and time preferences for the adult Danish population. Since subjects are generally risk averse, we find that joint elicitation provides estimates of discount rates that are significantly lower than those found in previous studies and more in line with what would be considered as a priori reasonable rates. The statistical specification relies on a theoretical framework that involves a latent trade-off between long-run optimization and short-run tempt...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Weinstein, Jonathan
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We show that a simple reputation-style test can always identify which of two experts is informed about the true distribution. The test presumes no prior knowledge of the true distribution, achieves any desired degree of precision in some fixed finite time, and does not use counterfactual predictions. Our analysis capitalizes on a result of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) on the rate of convergence of supermartingales. We use our setup to shed some light on the apparent paradox that a strategically...
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作者：Evans, Robert
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper studies a general model of holdup in a setting encompassing the models of Segal (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) among others. It is shown that if renegotiation is modeled as an infinite-horizon noncooperative bargaining game, then, with a simple initial contract, an efficient equilibrium will generally exist. The contract is robust in the sense that it does not depend on fine details of the model. The contract gives authority to one party to set the terms of trade and gives the oth...
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作者：Matzkin, Rosa L.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper provides conditions for identification of functionals in nonparametric simultaneous equations models with nonadditive unobservable random terms. The conditions are derived from a characterization of observational equivalence between models. We show that, in the models considered, observational equivalence can be characterized by a restriction on the rank of a matrix. The use of the new results is exemplified by deriving previously known results about identification in parametric and...
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作者：Fehr, Ernst; Tyran, Jean-Robert
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Copenhagen
摘要：Much evidence suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational, forward-looking decisions. This raises the question as to when the rational types are decisive for aggregate outcomes and when the boundedly rational types shape aggregate results. We examine this question in the context of a long-standing and important economic problem: the adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated monetary shock. Our experiments suggest that two types of bounded rati...
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作者：Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio; Volij, Oscar
作者单位：Brown University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Iowa State University
摘要：We study how professional players and college students play zero-sum two-person strategic games in a laboratory setting. We first ask professionals to play a 2 x 2 game that is formally identical to a strategic interaction situation that they face in their natural environment. Consistent with their behavior in the field, they play very close to the equilibrium of the game. In particular, (i) they equate their strategies' payoffs to the equilibrium ones and (ii) they generate sequences of choic...
