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作者：Winschel, Viktor; Kraetzig, Markus
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We present a comprehensive framework for Bayesian estimation of structural nonlinear dynamic economic models on sparse grids to overcome the curse of dimensionality for approximations. We apply sparse grids to a global polynomial approximation of the model solution, to the quadrature of integrals arising as rational expectations, and to three new nonlinear state space filters which speed up the sequential importance resampling particle filter. The posterior of the structural parameters is esti...
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作者：Ahn, David S.; Ergin, Haluk
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：The subjective likelihood of a contingency often depends on the manner in which it is described to the decision maker. To accommodate this dependence, we introduce a model of decision making under uncertainty that takes as primitive a family of preferences indexed by partitions of the state space. Each partition corresponds to a description of the state space. We characterize the following partition-dependent expected utility representation. The decision maker has a nonadditive set function nu...
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作者：Bajari, Patrick; Hong, Han; Ryan, Stephen P.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute all of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose simulation-based estimators for static, discrete games. We demonstrate that the model is identified under weak functional form assumptions using exclusion ...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent-proposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms-individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity-are essential to our analysis. An allocation rule is the agent-proposing deferred acceptance rule for some acceptant substitutable priority if and only if it satisfies non-wastefulness and individually ration...
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作者：Einav, Liran; Finkelstein, Amy; Schrimpf, Paul
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Much of the extensive empirical literature on insurance markets has focused on whether adverse selection can be detected. Once detected, however, there has been little attempt to quantify its welfare cost or to assess whether and what potential government interventions may reduce these costs. To do so, we develop a model of annuity contract choice and estimate it using data from the U.K. annuity market. The model allows for private information about mortality risk as well as heterogeneity in p...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：Columbia University; Yonsei University; Stanford University
摘要：The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assigning objects. The mechanism is easy to implement and strategy-proof. However, this mechanism is inefficient, because all agents may be made better off by another mechanism that increases their chances of obtaining more preferred objects. This form of inefficiency is eliminated by a mechanism called probabilistic serial, but this mechanism is not strategy-proof. Thus, which mechanism to employ in practical ap...
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作者：Bugni, Federico A.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper introduces a novel bootstrap procedure to perform inference in a wide class of partially identified econometric models. We consider econometric models defined by finitely many weak moment inequalities,2 which encompass many applications of economic interest. The objective of our inferential procedure is to cover the identified set with a prespecified probability.3 We compare our bootstrap procedure, a competing asymptotic approximation, and subsampling procedures in terms of the rat...
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作者：Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We consider a class of mechanism games in which there are multiple principals and three or more agents. For a mechanism game in this class, a sort of folk theorem holds: there is a threshold value for each of the principals such that an allocation is achieved at a pure-strategy sequential equilibrium of the game if and only if (i) it is incentive compatible and (ii) it attains an expected utility for each principal that is greater than or equal to the threshold value for the principal.
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作者：Wooders, John
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：Does expertise in strategic behavior obtained in the field transfer to the abstract setting of the laboratory? Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008) argued that the behavior of professional soccer players in mixed-strategy games conforms closely to minimax play, while the behavior of students (who are presumably novices in strategic situations requiring unpredictability) does not. We reexamine their data, showing that the play of professionals is inconsistent with the minimax hypothesis in several ...
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作者：Besanko, David; Doraszelski, Ulrich; Kryukov, Yaroslav; Satterthwaite, Mark
作者单位：Northwestern University; Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting are empirically important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. We show that forgetting does not simply negate learning. Rather, they are distinct economic forces that interact in subtle ways to produce a great variety of pricing behaviors and industry dynamics. In particular, a model with learni...
