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作者：Urbinati, Niccolo; LiCalzi, Marco
作者单位：Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：We study competitive equilibria in exchange economies when a continuum of goods is conflated into a finite set of commodities. The design of conflation choices affects the allocation of scarce resources among agents, by constraining trading opportunities and shifting competitive pressures. We demonstrate the consequences on relative prices, trading positions, and welfare.
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作者：Elliott, Matthew; Talamas, Eduard
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：Agents make noncontractible investments before bargaining over who matches with whom and their terms of trade. An agent is a price taker when her investments do not change her potential partners' payoffs. This incentivizes socially optimal investments. Across a variety of noncooperative bargaining models featuring dynamic entry, we show that everyone necessarily becomes a price taker as the discount factor goes to 1 if there is a minimal amount of competition always present in the market. If t...
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作者：Pycia, Marek; Unver, M. Utku
作者单位：University of Zurich; Boston College
摘要：In environments without transfers, market designers usually restrict attention to ordinal mechanisms. Ordinal mechanisms are simpler but miss potentially welfare-relevant information. Under what conditions is it without loss to focus on ordinal mechanisms? We show that all group strategy-proof mechanisms are ordinal. While not all Pareto efficient mechanisms are ordinal, all mechanisms maximizing an Arrovian social welfare function must be. These results accommodate feasibility constraints and...
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作者：Cohen, Rachelle; Maltz, Amnon; Ofek-Shanny, Yuval
作者单位：University of Haifa; University of Haifa; University of Erlangen Nuremberg
摘要：Many economic allocation decisions involve subjective judgment. This judgment may be perceived as fair when needs are considered but may seem unjust in cases of personal-taste discrimination. In an experimental impartial-spectator design, we explore perceptions of taste-based inequality and compare them to attitudes toward inequalities grounded in objective procedures, namely, merit and luck. We find that while taste-based inequality is perceived distinctly, it is treated as unfair, similar to...
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作者：Imura, Yuko; Thomas, Julia K.
作者单位：Bank of Canada; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the role of international trade in cross-country financial shock transmission using an equilibrium business cycle model calibrated to the United States and Canada. Heterogeneous firms have differing needs for external finance and face occasionally binding collateral constraints hindering their investments, while input-output linkages drive trade in final goods and intermediate inputs. Transmission of a U.S. financial shock recession into Canada's economy is qualitatively different fro...
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作者：Li, Jiangtao; Wang, Kexin
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Capital University of Economics & Business
摘要：We study contract design when the principal has limited information about the output distributions induced by the agent's actions. In a baseline model where only the means are known, we show that increasing affine contracts are robustly optimal. The mean restrictions accommodate a wide range of output distributions, including extreme cases that help establish this optimality. We then extend the analysis to environments with additional constraints on the distributions. Our main result shows tha...
