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作者：Fleckenstein, Quirin; Gopal, Manasa; Gutierrez, German; Hillenbrand, Sebastian
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Harvard University
摘要：We study the contribution of banks and nonbanks to cyclical fluctuations in the supply of syndicated loans. We find that a reduction in nonbank lending explains most of the contraction in syndicated credit and the associated employment losses during the Global Financial Crisis, while banks' contribution is small. Looking over multiple cycles, we find nonbanks' credit supply is roughly three times as cyclical as banks', suggesting that nonbanks are the main drivers of syndicated lending cycles....
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作者：Lyonnet, Victor; Chretien, Edouard
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Traditional and shadow banks interacted in similar ways in the 2007 and COVID-19 crises, when both assets and liabilities flew out of shadow banks and into traditional banks. We explain these facts in a model of the coexistence of traditional and shadow banks in which liabilities and assets flow from the former to the latter in good times, avoiding regulation, and move the other way in a crisis, alleviating fire sales. The model sheds light on how regulations for traditional banks have (uninte...
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作者：Metrick, Andrew; Schmelzing, Paul
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
摘要：We present a new database of banking-crisis interventions, covering 1,946 interventions in 20 categories across 143 countries. We demonstrate that crisis-intervention patterns are significantly related to income and fiscal variables and to measures of the political system and currency regime. GDP losses following crises are economically significant and are larger for wealthier countries, with some evidence that these losses are mitigated by democratic political systems and liberal currency reg...
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作者：Zhong, Hongda; Zhou, Zhen
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Tsinghua University
摘要：Many regulations aim to promote coordination among creditors in bankruptcy by ex post restricting their ability to exit distressed firms. However, such restrictions may harm creditors' ex ante incentives to stay invested, thereby worsening coordination outcomes. We build a dynamic coordination model to show how this force shapes creditor runs, bankruptcy filings, and regulation designs. Intriguingly, filing for bankruptcy early, thereby preserving more assets for latecomers, can prolong firm l...
