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作者：Bao, Dichu; Su, Lixin (Nancy); Zhao, Chris X.; Zhou, Gaoguang (Stephen)
作者单位：Lingnan University; Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Hong Kong Baptist University
摘要：Mandatory disclosure is a primary source of public information available to acquirers, yet little is known about how potential target managers respond to takeover threats by avoiding mandatory disclosure. This study focuses on redactions in material contracts as a setting of mandatory disclosure avoidance. We find that managers facing takeover threats are more likely to redact material contracts than other managers. To better differentiate the motives for redactions, we classify redacted contr...
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作者：Johnson, William C.; Karpoff, Jonathan M.; Wittry, Michael D.
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Lowell; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Using director-specific, within-firm variation in poison pills, we find that pilladopting nonexecutive directors experience a decrease in shareholder votes, an increase in termination rates across all their directorships, and a decrease in the likelihood of new board appointments. These consequences are not because of poor firm performance, active bid resistance, or hedge fund activism, and accrue especially when the adopted pill is relatively costly to the firm. Firms have positive stock pric...
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作者：Chen, Hongyu; Simchi-Levi, David
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Switchback experiments, in which experimental units are assigned to control and treatment interchangeably over time, have gained increasing popularity in recent years due to their ability to mitigate interference across units. Despite their wide adoption in the technology sector, drawing reliable inferences from such experiments remains challenging due to temporal interference. In this paper, we address this challenge by examining a special causal structure commonly found in a wide range of ap...
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作者：Aswani, Jitendra; Rajgopal, Shivaram
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Columbia University
摘要：Our analysis of green bonds issued between 2013 and 2022 reveals a distinctive shareholder preference for such assets, particularly among financial institutions. In the secondary market, the green bonds issued by financial firms' trade at a greenium of 8.2 basis points compared with matched samples, which is attributed potentially to the financial firms' efforts in channeling funds to green loans. Past work documenting a positive stock price reaction to the issuance of green bonds is isolated ...
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作者：Rogers, Parker
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：This article may be used only for the purposes of research, teaching, and/or private study. Commercial use or systematic downloading (by robots or other automatic processes) is prohibited without explicit Publisher approval, unless otherwise noted. For more information, contact permissions@informs.org. The Publisher does not warrant or guarantee the article's accuracy, completeness, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or non-infringement. Descriptions of, or references to, produ...
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作者：Lee, Yeonjoon
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：I study the role of vertical incentives between upstream issuers and downstream brokers in the retail bond market when there exist agency problems. Although arms-length transaction regulations require that vertical incentives not influence their activities, I show that both upstream issuers and downstream brokers are sensitive to vertical incentives. I then present a structural model in order to measure the degree of vertical incentives for downstream brokers, controlling for the extent of age...
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作者：Martin, Melissa; Timmermans, Oscar
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：Relative performance evaluation has become an increasingly common component of executive compensation contracts. We study how these incentive plans relate to corporate disclosure and predict that they introduce an incremental disclosure cost. This cost arises because disclosures can help competitors make better investment decisions, enhancing their performance and thereby reducing managers' expected compensation. Consistent with this prediction, we find a negative association between relative ...
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作者：Yueshen, Bart Zhou
作者单位：Singapore Management University
摘要：Limit orders submitted around the same time are subject to random latencies and will be queued accordingly. In equilibrium, end-of-queue limit orders always lose money-the liquidity supply appears excessive. The model generates empirical predictions regarding such overshooting liquidity: (i) new limit orders appear fleeting-clustered submissions are followed by immediate cancellations, (ii) the resulting cancel-to-add count ratio reflects adverse selection, and (iii) the cancel-to-add size rat...
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作者：Sandvik, Jason; Saouma, Richard; Seegert, Nathan; Stanton, Christopher
作者单位：University of Arizona; Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; Northeastern University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：In a field experiment, we find that a mandatory mentorship program raises worker productivity, whereas a voluntary version of the program does not. A significant reason why the mandatory program results in larger gains is that the lowest-productivity employees do not participate when the program is voluntary despite their having the greatest treatment benefits. A nationally representative survey of U.S. workers shows wide variation in human capital development program participation, suggesting...
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作者：Amini, Shahram; Mackinlay, Andrew; Rountree, Brian; Weston, James
作者单位：University of Denver; Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University; Rice University; Rice University
摘要：Recent studies suggest monitoring increases during economic downturns. In this study, we test whether firms' abnormal investment activity changes across the business cycle. Focusing on recessions, we find that firms not only curtail overinvestment but also reduce underinvestment, with the combined effect representing a significant 9% of average investment. Employing various proxies for monitoring intensity, we demonstrate that stronger governance mechanisms are associated with more pronounced ...
