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作者：Pleskac, Timothy J.; Kyung, Ellie J.; Chapman, Gretchen B.; Urminsky, Oleg
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Babson College; Carnegie Mellon University; University of Chicago
摘要：Blinded review is often proposed as a solution to inequities in merit-based evaluations. We tested this claim in a high-stakes field experiment comparing single-blind review (reviewer identities withheld) and double-blind review (reviewer and author identities withheld) for 530 academic conference submissions. On reliability, both processes showed moderate reliability, leading to only 40% overlap among top-rated submissions. This low overlap indicates that differences between review systems pa...
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作者：Billett, Matthew; Freeman, Kayla; Gao, Janet
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Georgetown University
摘要：We examine how access to debt markets affects firms' incentives to provide trade credit. Using hand-collected trade credit data between customer-supplier pairs and two exogenous shocks to firms' debt capacity, we show that better access to debt reduces firms' provision of trade credit per dollar of sales. The decline in trade credit is concentrated on ex ante powerful customers, but absent for weak ones, suggesting that better access to debt improves firms' bargaining position relative to powe...
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作者：Backus, Matthew; Blake, Thomas; Pettus, Jett; Tadelis, Steven
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Amazon.com; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Bargaining breakdown is common in bargaining in environments with incomplete information. We study whether, in these environments, permitting communication impacts bargaining outcomes. On May 23, 2016, eBay Germany's Best Offer platform introduced unstructured communication allowing desktop users, but not mobile users, to accompany offers with a message. Using this natural experiment, our difference-in-differences approach documents a 14% decrease in the rate of breakdown among compliers. Thou...
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作者：Cachon, Gerard P.; Dizdarer, Tolga; Tsoukalas, Gerry
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Boston College; Boston University
摘要：An open debate in platform design is who should control pricing: the platform (centralized pricing) or its service providers (decentralized pricing). We show that a key trade-off is between regulating competition and enabling price tailoring. Centralized pricing allows the platform to manage competition, but it faces information asymmetry as it cannot observe agent costs. Decentralized pricing lets agents adjust prices to their costs, but without oversight, competition can become too strong (p...
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作者：Debo, Laurens G.; Snitkovsky, Ran I.
作者单位：Dartmouth College; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Tipping is a complex phenomenon cutting across various stakeholders-firms, customers, and workers. Analyzing the long-run impact of policies related to tipping is therefore challenging. To facilitate such analysis, we develop a modeling framework in which a tipping norm forms endogenously in a market consisting of a firm that offers service to potential customers. Customers choose whether to consume the service or not and, if yes, how much to tip the server afterward. With tipping, customers s...
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作者：Ashraf, Anik
作者单位：University of Munich
摘要：Performance ranking can trigger multiple social incentives for workers. On one hand, it offers status rewards to induce them to increase effort. On the other, better-ranked workers may reduce effort to conform to coworkers' productivity in fear of social retribution. This paper uses a field experiment in a sweater factory to disentangle the incentives underlying performance ranks. Treated workers receive ranks either privately or publicly. I find that private ranks do not have any effect on av...
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作者：Cont, Rama; Cucuringu, Mihai; Xu, Renyuan; Zhang, Chao
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Oxford; New York University; New York University Tandon School of Engineering; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (Guangzhou)
摘要：The estimation of loss distributions for dynamic portfolios requires the simulation of scenarios representing realistic joint dynamics of their components. We propose a novel data-driven approach for simulating realistic, high-dimensional multiasset scenarios, focusing on accurately representing tail risk for a class of static and dynamic trading strategies. We exploit the joint elicitability property of Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall to design a Generative Adversarial Network that learn...
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作者：Belenzon, Sharon; Cioaca, Larisa
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tulane University
摘要：The U.S. government incentivizes firms to develop innovative technologies by awarding research and development (R&D) contracts that often carry an implicit promise of guaranteed demand. Firms that demonstrate strong technological capabilities are rewarded with noncompetitive production contracts for the resulting products and services. Using newly assembled data on $4.2 trillion in government procurement contracts from all federal agencies, matched to U.S. publicly traded firms, we document a ...
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作者：Han, Pengfei; Liu, Chunrui; Tian, Xuan; Wang, Kexin
作者单位：Peking University; University of International Business & Economics; Tsinghua University; Renmin University of China
摘要：We find the death of distance in venture capital (VC) investment caused by the COVID-19 pandemic: VCs invest in more distant startups during the COVID-19 lockdowns, and such effects continue after the economy reopens. The death of distance is more pronounced when there is better internet infrastructure, lower information asymmetry between VCs and entrepreneurs, and smaller deal size. The pandemic-spurred advancement and adoption of remote communication technology contribute to the documented o...
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作者：Chen, Yunsen; Lu, Yao; Zheng, Dengjin
作者单位：Central University of Finance & Economics; Tsinghua University
摘要：We find that boardroom centrality increases the market beta of firms. The higher stock returns of firms with high boardroom centrality diminish and turn statistically insignificant after controlling for market betas. The effect can be attributed to a comovement in accounting fundamentals and financial policies. Overall, these findings highlight the fact that the social networks of corporate leaders (i.e., directors of corporate boards) can have a substantial effect on firms' systematic risk ex...
