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作者：Chabot, Christine
作者单位：Loyola University Chicago
摘要：Over thirty years ago, in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court ordered judges to defer to administrative agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Chevron's deference doctrine has since proved to be a resounding failure. The Supreme Court has applied Chevron in a highly unpredictable manner, failing to offer agencies and lower courts adequate guidance. In response, this Article compares interpretive problems arising under Chevron...
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作者：Kempson, Judson
作者单位：American University
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作者：Wansley, Matthew
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：A regulatory ageng is captured if, instead of the public interest, it pursues the interests of powerfid firms it is intended to regulate. Scholars disagree about which agencies are captured, how they become captured, and what reforms, if any, can prevent capture. There is consensus on one issue: capture is a vice. In this Article, I argue that capture can be a virtue. When powerful interest groups thwart justified regulation, the optimal strategy for pursuing that regulation may be to indirect...
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作者：Garber, Lindsey
作者单位：American University
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作者：Mead, Joseph; Fromherz, Nicholas
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Cleveland State University; University System of Ohio; Cleveland State University
摘要：For more than one hundred years, Congress has experimented with review of agency action by single judge district courts, multiple-judge district courts, and direct review by circuit courts. This tinkering has not given way to a stable design. Rather than settling on a uniform scheme or at least a scheme with a discernible organizing principle Congress has left litigants with a jurisdictional maze that varies unpredictably across and within statutes and agencies. In this Article, we offer a fre...
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作者：Levin, Ronald
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
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作者：Satz, Meridith
作者单位：American University
