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作者：Witko, Christopher
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
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作者：Persson, Anna; Rothstein, Bo; Teorell, Jan
作者单位：University of Gothenburg; Lund University
摘要：In reply to Marquette and Peiffer's article Grappling With the 'Real Politics' of Systemic Corruption: Theoretical Debates Versus 'Real-World' Functions, this article employs three criticisms: Marquette and Peiffer's call to grapple with the real politics of corruption does not bring much new to the table, is conceptually flawed, and risks serving as an excuse for corrupt elites to pursue business as usual. In response, we reaffirm three insights gained from collective action-based approaches ...
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作者：Magbadelo, John Olushola
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作者：Marquette, Heather; Peiffer, Caryn
作者单位：University of Birmingham; University of Bristol
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作者：Wynen, Jan; Verhoest, Koen; Kleizen, Bjorn
作者单位：University of Antwerp; Tilburg University
摘要：In the last decade, reforms in the public sector have been implemented at an ever-increasing pace. Hereby, organizations are repetitively subject to mergers, splits, absorptions, or secessions of units; the adoption of new tasks; changes in legal status; and other structural reforms. Although evidence is largely missing in the literature, there is a growing belief that such intense reform sequences may be damaging to organizations. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature by empiri...
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作者：Li, Li; Pang, Baoqing; Wu, Yiping
作者单位：China University of Political Science & Law; Shanghai University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This article empirically investigates the effects of administrative monitoring on the misuse of funds by local governments and provides a representative model of fiscal decentralization with political centralization, where administrative monitoring relies on the top-down hierarchy of the bureaucratic system in China based on a unique data set from audit programs. We show a double effect between distance and monitoring in local China. The incentive for misusing public funds can be strengthened ...
