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作者:Zeff, Stephen A.
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作者:McGuire, Sean T.; Wang, Dechun; Wilson, Ryan J.
作者单位:Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Oregon
摘要:This study investigates whether the agency conflicts inherent in a dual class ownership structure are associated with the level of firms' tax avoidance. Dual class ownership presents a unique agency problem because insiders control a majority of the votes of a firm despite having claims to a minority of the firm's cash flows. We examine the level of tax avoidance for a sample of dual class firms and find that the extent of tax avoidance declines as the difference between voting rights and cash...
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作者:Lundholm, Russell J.; Rogo, Rafael; Zhang, Jenny Li
作者单位:University of British Columbia
摘要:We examine the readability of text and the use of numbers in the annual filings and earnings press releases of foreign firms listed on U. S. stock exchanges. We find that foreign firms generally write clearer text and present relatively more numerical data than their U. S. firm counterparts. More importantly, we find that the readability of the text and use of numbers increases as the foreign firms get geographically further from the U. S. It also increases as the foreign firm's home country h...
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作者:Cadman, Brian; Sunder, Jayanthi
作者单位:Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of Arizona
摘要:We examine the relation between shareholder investment horizon and chief executive officer (CEO) horizon incentives derived from compensation contracts. We find that influential incumbent shareholders provide managers with short-horizon incentives to maximize current firm value when these shareholders plan to sell their stock. Specifically, we use the initial public offering (IPO) setting in which venture capitalists (VCs) represent short-horizon, controlling investors with strong selling ince...
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作者:Norris, Floyd
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作者:Rose, Jacob M.; Rose, Anna M.; Norman, Carolyn Strand; Mazza, Cheri R.
作者单位:Bentley University; Virginia Commonwealth University; Sacred Heart University
摘要:Our paper examines three related questions: Will directors who have friendship ties with the CEO manage earnings to benefit the CEO in the short term while potentially sacrificing the welfare of the company in the long term? Will public disclosure of friendship ties mitigate or exacerbate such behavior, and will disclosure of friendship ties influence investors' perceptions of director decisions? We conduct an experiment involving 56 active and experienced corporate directors from U. S. firms ...
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作者:Evans, John Harry, III
作者单位:Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh