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作者：Banker, Rajiv D.; Byzalov, Dmitri; Plehn-Dujowich, Jose M.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Saint Mary's College of California
摘要：We investigate analytically and empirically the relationship between demand uncertainty and cost behavior. We argue that with more uncertain demand, unusually high realizations of demand become more likely. Accordingly, firms will choose a higher capacity of fixed inputs when uncertainty increases in order to reduce congestion costs. Higher capacity levels imply a more rigid short-run cost structure with higher fixed and lower variable costs. We formalize this counterintuitive argument in a si...
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作者：Badertscher, Brad A.; Burks, Jeffrey J.; Easton, Peter D.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：When the fair value of an investment security falls below amortized cost and there is significant doubt that the firm can hold the security until the fair value recovers, an other-than-temporary impairment (OTTI) is recognized in net income. Thus, an OTTI is a disclosure about the prospect of recovering an unrealized loss. Our findings suggest that investors priced banks' OTTI recognition during and after the financial crisis. Investors were unable to fully anticipate reported OTT's, and price...
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作者：Hennes, Karen M.; Leone, Andrew J.; Miller, Brian P.
作者单位：University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman; University of Miami; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：This study examines the conditions under which financial restatements lead corporate boards to dismiss external auditors and how the market responds to those dismissal announcements. We find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after more severe restatements but that the severity effect is primarily attributable to the dismissal of non-Big 4 auditors rather than Big 4 auditors. We also document that among corporations with Big 4 auditors, those that are larger and more complex operati...
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作者：Evans, John Harry, III; Luo, Shuqing; Nagarajan, Nandu J.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National University of Singapore
摘要：The design of CEO incentives is particularly important for firms in financial distress. We compare the resolution of CEO incentive problems in distressed firms between the 1980s versus the 1990s, focusing on how changes in contractual provisions, as well as in the executive labor market, resulted in a shift to a new equilibrium. Our analyses provide evidence that the increased bargaining power of creditors, together with changes in the use of contractual provisions in the 1990s, enabled credit...
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作者：Taylor, Eileen Z.
作者单位：North Carolina State University
