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作者：Cardinaels, Eddy; Chen, Clara Xiaoling; Yin, Huaxiang
作者单位：KU Leuven; Tilburg University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Nanyang Technological University
摘要：Many companies administer wage policies based on tournaments or have different salaries attached to various promotion-based ranks within the company. Employees, however, do not always receive information about pay-level differences at higher ranks prior to joining the company. While some companies openly disclose prize spread information across these ranks, others keep such information secret. In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether the availability of tournament prize spread info...
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作者：Bauer, Andrew M.; Henderson, Darren; Lynch, Daniel P.
作者单位：University of Waterloo; Wilfrid Laurier University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Internal controls influence information quality, thus affecting the ability of supply chain partners, who rely on collaborative systems of information sharing, to reliably contract. Using SOX-related internal control assessments as a proxy for internal control quality and U.S. GAAP-mandated major customer disclosures, we find that supplier internal control quality influences supply chain relationship duration. Specifically, our evidence demonstrates that: (1) poor internal control quality incr...
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作者：Baginski, Stephen P.; Campbell, John L.; Hinson, Lisa A.; Koo, David S.
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Theory argues that career concerns (i.e., concerns about the impact of current performance on contemporaneous and future compensation) encourage managers to withhold bad news disclosure. However, empirical evidence regarding the extent to which a manager's career concerns are associated with a delay in bad news disclosure is limited. Across multiple proxies for career concerns, we find that the extent to which managers delay bad news is positively associated with their level of career concerns...
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作者：Heinle, Mirko S.; Smith, Kevin C.; Verrecchia, Robert E.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：While researchers and practitioners alike estimate firms' exposures to systematic risk factors, the disclosure literature typically assumes that exposures are common knowledge. We develop a model where the firm's exposure to a factor is unknown, and analyze the effects of factor-exposure uncertainty on share price and the effects of disclosure about the exposure. We find that: (1) factor-exposure uncertainty introduces skewness and excess kurtosis in the cash flow distribution relative to the ...
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作者：Chen, Chen; Martin, Xiumin; Roychowdhury, Sugata; Wang, Xin; Billett, Matthew T.
作者单位：Monash University; Washington University (WUSTL); Boston College; University of Hong Kong; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：This paper investigates the effect of internal information asymmetry (IIA) within conglomerate firms on the quality of management forecasts and financial statements. We develop a novel measure to capture IIA between divisional managers and top corporate managers, computed as the difference in their respective trading profits on their own company's stock (DIFRET). Numerous validation tests indicate that DIFRET indeed captures the information asymmetry between divisional managers and top manager...
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作者：Harp, Nancy L.; Barnes, Beau Grant
作者单位：Clemson University; Washington State University
摘要：This study examines internal control weaknesses (ICWs) reported under Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 302 in the context of mergers and acquisitions. We predict that problems in an acquirer's internal control environment have adverse operational implications for acquisition performance. We argue that acquirers with low-quality internal information needed to select profitable acquisitions will make poorer acquisition decisions. We also argue that ICWs impede effective monitoring and are likely to ...
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作者：Harris, Trevor S.; Khan, Urooj; Nissim, Doron
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Estimating expected credit losses on banks' portfolios is difficult. The issue has become of increasing interest to academics and regulators with the FASB and IASB issuing new regulations for loan impairment. We develop a measure of the one-year-ahead expected rate of credit losses (ExpectedRCL) that combines various measures of credit risk disclosed by banks. It uses cross-sectional analyses to obtain coefficients for estimating each period's measure of expected credit losses. ExpectedRCL sub...
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作者：Lin, Yupeng; Mao, Ying; Wang, Zheng
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Lingnan University; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We document peer effect as an important factor in determining corporate voluntary disclosure policies. Our identification strategy relies on a discontinuity in the distribution of institutional ownership caused by the annual Russell 1000/2000 index reconstitution. Around the threshold of the Russell 1000/2000 index, the top Russell 2000 index firms experience a significant jump in institutional ownership compared with their closely neighbored bottom Russell 1000 index firms due to index funds'...
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作者：Glaum, Martin; Landsman, Wayne R.; Wyrwa, Sven
作者单位：WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Justus Liebig University Giessen
摘要：This study investigates the determinants of goodwill impairment decisions by firms applying IFRS based on a comprehensive sample of stock-listed firms from 21 countries. Multivariate logistical regression findings indicate that goodwill impairment incidence is negatively associated with economic performance, but also related to proxies for managerial and firm-level incentives. In addition, whereas goodwill impairment tends to be timely for firms in high enforcement countries, firms in low enfo...
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作者：Nelson, Mark W.; Proell, Chad A.
作者单位：Cornell University; Texas Christian University
摘要：This paper examines audit team leader reactions to auditors who speak up about potentially important audit issues. Study 1 is a survey of interacting audit teams and provides evidence of higher performance evaluations for auditors who speak up. Studies 2, 3, and 4 are experiments examining team leader reactions to speaking up, both at the time speaking up occurs (Study 2) and later, during performance evaluation (Studies 2, 3, and 4). Results provide evidence that team leaders react with irrit...
