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作者：Zhang, Dana
作者单位：Susquehanna University
摘要：The accounting literature often views managers as individuals whose financial reporting decisions are determined by their economic incentives and individual characteristics. However, managers typically work in a team and most decisions have at least some input from other members of the team. This study examines the impacts of two top management team (TMT) characteristics on financial reporting quality. The results indicate that background homogeneity and long-shared working experience are each...
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作者：Emett, Scott A.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：I examine how and why current-period performance shapes investors' evaluations of future-oriented disclosures. Three experiments provide evidence that a firm's current-period performance shapes investors' beliefs about the appropriateness of managerial optimism, which, in turn, affects investors' evaluation of firms that focus on either challenges or opportunities in future-oriented disclosures. When a firm is performing poorly, investors believe that managers can best achieve success by being...
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作者：Lee, Kyungha (Kari); Menon, Rahul
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：This paper develops an economic model of how subjectivity in accounting estimates affects a manager's reporting behavior and auditors' subsequent information aggregation decision. In our model, the auditor receives a potentially manipulated report from the manager and uses an additional, albeit less precise, estimate to verify the report. We show, perhaps surprisingly, that as subjectivity increases, the auditor puts more weight on the manager's report, but the manager manipulates her report l...
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作者：Bizjak, John M.; Kalpathy, Swaminathan L.; Mihov, Vassil T.
作者单位：Texas Christian University
摘要：We find that firms that grant performance-contingent (p-c) equity awards with accounting-based vesting conditions to their CEOs have lower cost of debt and less restrictive loan terms. The benefits of p-c accounting-based awards on debt financing are greater when the moral hazard problem faced by debtholders is potentially more significant-for example, for firms with poorer credit ratings and lower asset tangibility. We find some evidence that certain types of p-c equity awards with stock pric...
