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作者：Gomez, Enrique A.; Heflin, Frank L.; Wang, Jasmine
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Virginia
摘要：We study firms' decisions to provide non-GAAP income statements and the information environment consequences of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters directing them to stop disclosing such statements. We find firms voluntarily disclose non-GAAP income statements when firm and disclosure complexity, analyst following, and institutional ownership are higher. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that, after firms stop disclosing full non-GAAP income statements at t...
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作者：Hung, Chung -Yu; Lillis, Anne M.; Wu, Anne
作者单位：University of Melbourne; National Chengchi University
摘要：We investigate circumstances in which referral-based hiring can exacerbate rather than mitigate agency problems. When incentive contracts cannot fully align employees' incentives with the interests of the firm, employees may behave opportunistically. Referred job candidates likely obtain inside information from existing employees about opportunistic incentive responses, and it is this information that exacerbates agency problems. Our research setting enables us to distinguish between referred ...
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作者：Guenther, David A.; Sansing, Richard C.
作者单位：University of Oregon; Dartmouth College; Tilburg University
摘要：We investigate the relation between tax rates and pretax returns by showing how implicit tax, tax incidence, and tax capitalization change in response to a tax rate change. We examine these issues in the context of both financial assets and real investments made by corporations in a competitive equilibrium in which all investments earn the same after-tax rate of return. Results show that the pretax return increases in the statutory tax rate due to an explicit tax rate effect and decreases due ...
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作者：Bornemann, Tobias; Jacob, Martin; Sailer, Mariana
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
摘要：The limitation of executive compensation has been a matter of public and policy debate for at least 20 years. We examine a regulatory action in Austria in 2014 where the tax deductibility of the total value of executive compensation is unavoidably limited. We find no average effects on the growth or composition of executives' pay. However, the deductibility limit affects the managers of firms with low bargaining power and of firms with strong corporate governance, indicating that they are affe...
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作者：Even-Tov, Omri; Su, Andy (Jiarui); Wang, K. Philip
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We examine the impact of reducing information processing costs on U.S. state regulators who supervise mortgage companies. State regulators traditionally disclosed enforcement actions only on their individual websites. A centralized repository, introduced in 2012, assembled enforcement records across states in one place, reducing a regulator's cost to learn about enforcements in other states. Using a difference-in-differences design, find that enforcement records posted on the centralized repos...
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作者：Kim, Sunyoung; Mate, Michal; Park, Jongwon
作者单位：Monash University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：Using data on earnings targets in annual bonus plans, we construct and validate an empirical measure of beginning-of-year target difficulty and show that it is negatively associated with market uncertainty, retention concerns, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) entrenchment. We then present several findings about the effect of target difficulty on performance and CEO compensation. First, greater target difficulty in annual bonus plans is associated with significantly lower CEO cash compensation...
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作者：Hou, Liya; Liang, Yi; Basu, Sudipta
作者单位：Minnesota State Colleges & Universities; Saint Cloud State University; University of Virginia; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
摘要：We study the influence of bank competition on U.S. public borrowers' accounting conservatism by exploiting the staggered adoption of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994, which increased the threats of new bank entrants and actual bank entry. We find that borrowers' conditional conservatism fell after IBBEA. Conservatism fell more for firms located in states with weak incumbent banks and states with more out-of-state entrants, especially entrants with...
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作者：Sheeley, Bret
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Companies are offering managers compensation incentives to increase promotions of underrepresented employees to higher level organizational positions (hereafter, diversity incentives). This study uses an experiment to examine how diversity incentives affect managers' promotion decisions and employees' effort choices before and after those decisions. The results suggest that managers' diversity incentives do not affect employees' pre-promotion effort choices. Additional analyses indicate that b...
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作者：Gox, Robert F.; Michaeli, Beatrice
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study how the precision of managers' private post-contract pre-decision information affects the pay-performance relation. Endogenizing the information environment, we find that firms may optimally tie executive pay closer to firm performance as agency problems become more pronounced. Specifically, varying parameters measuring the severity of the agency problem, we identify parameter regions where firms with more pronounced agency problems optimally combine uninformative signals with a highe...
