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作者：Thompson, Anne M.; Urcan, Oktay; Yoon, Hayoung
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Southern Methodist University
摘要：The Securities and Exchange Commission permits companies to redact proprietary information from material contract filings, so long as the redacted information (1) would cause competitive harm if disclosed, and (2) the information is legally immaterial. Because these joint criteria are inherently contradictory, we examine whether legally immaterial redacted information is economically material to investors. We find that firms' stock price discovery process is significantly slower and insider tr...
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作者：Langberg, Nisan; Rothenberg, Naomi
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Alberta
摘要：We study audit quality and investment efficiency when an analyst's information can curb overvaluation and auditors are subject to legal liability following audit failure. With the auditor's damage payment based on price inflation after audit failure, the analyst's information brings prices closer to fundamentals and provides a hedge to the auditor against legal liability risk. This weakens incentives for audit quality, and the analyst responds with more information production due to the penalt...
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作者：Chow, Travis K.; Hoopes, Jeffrey L.; Maydew, Edward L.
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine
摘要：We undertake the first empirical analysis of profit shifting by U.S. firms during foreign tax holidays. We show that foreign tax holidays have become a prevalent and powerful tax planning strategy among U.S. firms. We find that U.S. firms significantly increase their outbound profit shifting while participating in foreign tax holidays. However, we also find that profit shifting associated with tax holidays comes at the cost of increased tax uncertainty. Our results have important implications ...
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作者：Rawson, Caleb; Twedt, Brady J.; Watkins, Jessica C.
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Notre Dame
摘要：This study examines managers' strategic use of concurrent disclosures around the announcement of negative material events. We predict and find that managers disclosing negative 8-K news are more likely to issue a concurrent press release about an unrelated event relative to a press release providing additional context for the 8-K-triggering event in order to increase investor information processing costs. This strategy appears distinct from the bundling of news to deter litigation. We find tha...
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作者：Guan, Yuyan; Kim, Jeong-Bon; Liu, Boluo; Xin, Xiangang
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; City University of Hong Kong; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Utilizing the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) setting as an exogenous shock to bond market transparency, we find that improved bond market transparency leads to lower crash risk in the stock market, consistent with increased information spillover from the bond market into the stock market. Results from the Path analysis suggest that bond market transparency affects stock price crash risk not only directly, but also indirectly through its effects on management guidance, analyst fo...
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作者：Smith, Kevin C.
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：In this paper, I develop a measure of the difference in the amount of information that investors expect a forthcoming disclosure to contain should it reveal good news versus bad news (the disclosure's asymmetry). To do so, I first show that this asymmetry is linked to the skewness of returns that the disclosure creates. I then show that this skewness can be measured using a weighted change in option-implied return skewness leading up to the disclosure's release. The measure's ability to captur...
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作者：Laux, Volker; Zheng, Ronghuo
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We study the optimal information system in a debt contracting setting in which managers can engage in value destroying risk-shifting behavior. The information system issues early-warning signals that allow lenders to take corrective actions such as liquidating unprofitable projects. When managers are empire builders, the optimal system exhibits a conservative bias that leads to excessive early-warning signals and excessive project liquidations relative to first best. In contrast, when managers...
