2023

最新文章

• Using Economic Links between Firms to Detect Accounting Fraud AI翻译
  作者：Li, Chenchen; Li, Ningzhong; Zhang, Frank
  作者单位：Nanjing University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Yale University
  摘要：We explore whether accounting fraud can be detected using the information of firms economically linked to a focal firm. Specifically, we examine whether customer information disclosed by a supplier firm, combined with customers' accounting information, helps to detect the supplier's revenue fraud. We first confirm the economic link between the supplier and customers by showing a strong positive correlation between the supplier's sales growth and the growth rate of total customer purchases. We ...
• Do Internal Control Weaknesses Affect Firms' Demand for Accounting Skills? Evidence from US Job Postings AI翻译
  作者：Gao, Janet; Merkley, Kenneth J.; Pacelli, Joseph; Schroeder, Joseph H.
  作者单位：Georgetown University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Harvard University; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
  摘要：In this study, we examine whether firms respond to internal control weaknesses (ICWs) by requiring accounting-specific skills when hiring rank-and-file employees. Using unique data containing an extensive collection of job postings, we document significant increases in firms' job postings that list accounting skills after the disclosure of an ICW. This effect is more pronounced for firms with better financial resources and when ICWs are more severe or personnel-related. In addition, our result...
• Paying to Reduce Disparity: Financially Incentivizing Workforce Diversity and Its Effects on Managers' Promotion Decisions and Employees' Effort AI翻译
  作者：Sheeley, Bret
  作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
  摘要：Companies are offering managers compensation incentives to increase promotions of underrepresented employees to higher level organizational positions (hereafter, diversity incentives). This study uses an experiment to examine how diversity incentives affect managers' promotion decisions and employees' effort choices before and after those decisions. The results suggest that managers' diversity incentives do not affect employees' pre-promotion effort choices. Additional analyses indicate that b...
• Ambiguous Sticks and Carrots: The Effect of Contract Framing and Payoff Ambiguity on Employee Effort AI翻译
  作者：Burke, Joseph; Towry, Kristy L.; Young, Donald; Zureich, Jacob
  作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; Emory University; Tilburg University
  摘要：Research suggests that employees work harder under penalty contracts than under economically equivalent bonus contracts. We build on this literature by examining how the motivational advantage of penalty contracts depends on a common aspect of real-world contracts: payoff ambiguity. With payoff ambiguity, employees provide effort without knowing how much pay they will receive for a given level of performance. According to our theory, this ambiguity opens the door for employee optimism, which h...
• Cost Structure and Tax-Motivated Income Shifting AI翻译
  作者：McGuire, Sean T.; Rane, Scott G.; Weaver, Connie D.
  作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
  摘要：We examine whether cost structure influences tax-motivated income shifting. We predict and find that U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) with a less rigid cost structure engage in greater levels of tax-motivated income shifting relative to MNCs with a more rigid cost structure. This result is consistent with a less rigid cost structure providing greater flexibility to enable MNCs to take advantage of income-shifting opportunities. Further, we find that this relation is more pronounced when ...
• Externalities of Accounting Disclosures: Evidence from the Federal Reserve AI翻译
  作者：Li, Edward X.; Lind, Gary; Ramesh, K.; Shen, Min
  作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Rice University
  摘要：This study provides the first empirical evidence that the Federal Reserve (the Fed) systematically retrieves micro-level accounting reports to aid its understanding of the state of the macroeconomy. Using unique data identifying its direct access of corporate SEC filings, we show that the Fed tracks firms that are bellwethers and industry leaders, or that can engender systemic risk. The qualitative information in the Fed-accessed periodic reports explains the Fed's GDP growth forecasts for up ...
• An Option-Based Approach to Measuring Disclosure Asymmetry AI翻译
  作者：Smith, Kevin C.
  作者单位：Stanford University
  摘要：In this paper, I develop a measure of the difference in the amount of information that investors expect a forthcoming disclosure to contain should it reveal good news versus bad news (the disclosure's asymmetry). To do so, I first show that this asymmetry is linked to the skewness of returns that the disclosure creates. I then show that this skewness can be measured using a weighted change in option-implied return skewness leading up to the disclosure's release. The measure's ability to captur...
• Private Pre-Decision Information and the Pay-Performance Relation AI翻译
  作者：Gox, Robert F.; Michaeli, Beatrice
  作者单位：University of Zurich; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
  摘要：We study how the precision of managers' private post-contract pre-decision information affects the pay-performance relation. Endogenizing the information environment, we find that firms may optimally tie executive pay closer to firm performance as agency problems become more pronounced. Specifically, varying parameters measuring the severity of the agency problem, we identify parameter regions where firms with more pronounced agency problems optimally combine uninformative signals with a highe...
• Tainted Executives as Outside Directors AI翻译
  作者：Baer, Leah M.; Ertimur, Yonca; Zhang, Jingjing
  作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; McGill University
  摘要：We examine outside board appointments of executives allegedly involved in governance failurestainted executives-to shed light on appointing firms' underlying motivations. Less attractive firms and those with greater advising needs are more likely to appoint tainted executives to their boards than other firms are. Tainted appointees are less likely to be placed on the nominating and governance committees than nontainted appointees. Tainted appointees have similar or better skill sets compared w...
• Tax Competition and Employment AI翻译
  作者：Glaeser, Stephen A.; Olbert, Marcel; Werner, Ann-Catherin
  作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; University of London; London Business School; University of Mannheim
  摘要：We examine how exposure to international tax competition affects domestic firms' employment. Consistent with prior work, we find evidence that reductions in foreign tax rates affect the domestic competitive environment via increases in import competition and investment in foreign-owned subsidiaries. We posit that these changes in the domestic competitive environment can cause managers to reduce their firms' employment levels. Consistent with our expectation, we find that relative decreases in ...