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作者：Libby, Robert; Hunton, James E.; Tan, Hun-Tong; Seybert, Nicholas
作者单位：Cornell University; Maastricht University; Bentley University; Nanyang Technological University
摘要：We examine whether analysts' incentives to maintain good relationships with management contribute to the optimistic/pessimistic within-period time trend in analysts' forecasts. In our experiments, 81 experienced sell-side analysts from two brokerage firms predict earnings based on historical information and management guidance. Analysts' forecasts exhibit an optimistic/pessimistic pattern across the two timing conditions (early and late in the quarter), and the effect is significantly stronger...
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作者：Gibbs, Michael
作者单位：University of Chicago
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作者：Hope, Ole-Kristian; Thomas, Wayne B.
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman
摘要：This study tests the agency cost hypothesis in the context of geographic earnings disclosures. The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers, when not monitored by shareholders, make self-maximizing decisions that may not necessarily be in the best interest of shareholders. These decisions include aggressively growing the firm, which reduces profitability and destroys firm value. Geographic earnings disclosures provide an interesting context to examine this issue. Beginning with Statement ...
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作者：Ng, Jeffrey; Rusticus, Tjomme O.; Verdi, Rodrigo S.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper examines the effect of transaction costs on the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Using standard market microstructure features we show that transaction costs constrain the informed trades that are necessary to incorporate earnings information into price. This implies weaker return responses at the time of the earnings announcement and higher subsequent returns drift for firms with higher transaction costs. Consistent with this prediction, we find that earnings response coeff...
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作者：Weber, Joseph; Willenborg, Michael; Zhang, Jieying
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Connecticut; University of Southern California
摘要：We study the stock and audit market effects associated with a widely publicized accounting scandal involving a public company (ComROAD AG) and a large, reputable audit firm (KPMG) in a country (Germany) that has long provided auditors with substantial protection from shareholder legal liability. We use this event to study whether an auditor's reputation helps to ensure audit quality, a rationale for which recent literature and events provide scant support. Given the absence of a strong insuran...
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作者：Lafond, Ryan; Roychowdhury, Sugata
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In this paper we examine the effect of managerial ownership on financial reporting conservatism. Separation of ownership and control gives rise to agency problems between managers and shareholders. Financial reporting conservatism is one potential mechanism to address these agency problems. We hypothesize that, as managerial ownership declines, the severity of agency problem increases, increasing the demand for conservatism. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that conservatism as measured...
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作者：Daske, Holger; Hail, Luzi; Leuz, Christian; Verdi, Rodrigo
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Pennsylvania; University of Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper examines the economic consequences of mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) reporting around the world. We analyze the effects on market liquidity, cost of capital, and Tobin's q in 26 countries using a large sample of firms that are mandated to adopt IFRS. We find that, on average, market liquidity increases around the time of the introduction of IFRS. We also document a decrease in firms' cost of capital and an increase in equity valuations, but only if we a...
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作者：Mayew, William J.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper considers the potential for public information disclosures to complement the existing private information of financial analysts. In such a setting, analysts allowed to participate during earnings conference calls by asking questions receive public signals that can facilitate the generation of new and valuable private information for the asking analyst. Realizing these public signals are valuable for the asking analyst, managers can use their discretion to discriminate among analysts...
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作者：Laux, Volker
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This paper analyzes how board independence affects the CEO's ability to extract rents from the firm. The CEO is assumed to possess private information about his ability, which the board needs in order to decide whether to replace him. If the board is more active in removing low quality CEOs, the incumbent is better able to use his information advantage to extract rents. Since the board cannot commit not to renegotiate the contract, a board that is fully independent from the CEO is more active ...
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作者：Eberhart, Allan; Maxwell, William; Siddique, Akhtar
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Arizona
摘要：Many previous studies document a positive relation between research and development (R&D) and equity value. Though R&D can increase equity value by increasing firm value, it can also increase equity value at the expense of bondholder wealth through an increase in firm risk because equity is analogous to a call option on the underlying firm value. Shi [2003] tests this hypothesis by examining the relation between a firm's R&D intensity and its bond ratings and risk premiums at issuance. His res...
