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作者：Nicoletti, Allison; Zhu, Christina
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We examine the economic consequences of a rule designed to improve consumers' understanding of mortgage information. The 2015 TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosures rule (TRID) simplifies the mortgage disclosures provided to consumers. As a consequence, TRID-affected mortgages become a less attractive investment opportunity to banks. Our main results document that mortgage applications affected by TRID are less likely to be approved following the rule's effective date. We find evidence consistent w...
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作者：Tomar, Sorabh
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：I examine the effects of the U.S. Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Reporting Program, which requires thousands of industrial facilities to measure and report their GHG emissions. I show that facilities reduce their GHG emissions by 7.9% following the disclosure of emissions data. The evidence indicates that benchmarking-whereby facilities use the disclosures of their peers to assess their own relative GHG performance-spurs emission reductions. Firms' concerns about future legislation appear to motivate th...
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作者：Liu, Jiancheng (Duncan); Shi, Wei; Zeng, Cheng; Zhang, Guochang
作者单位：University of Macau; Deakin University; Hong Kong Polytechnic University; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We investigate how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by publicly listed firms in the European Union affects peer private firms. We find that private firms' capital investment decreases significantly after the IFRS mandate, relative to public firms. Private firms also display decreased investment when benchmarked against firms relatively insulated from the impact of the IFRS mandate, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller in this case. These result...
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作者：Cohen, Shira; Kadach, Igor; Ormazabal, Gaizka; Reichelstein, Stefan
作者单位：California State University System; San Diego State University; University of Navarra; IESE Business School; University of Mannheim; Stanford University
摘要：Using a wide sample of international publicly traded firms, this paper studies the rapidly increasing practice of incorporating Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that this compensation practice varies at the country, industry, and firm levels in ways that are consistent with efficient incentive contracting. We also observe that reliance on ESG metrics in executive compensation arrangements is associated with engagemen...
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作者：Gallo, Lindsey A.; Lynch, Kendall V.; Tomy, Rimmy E.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Chicago
摘要：We study the role of a relatively new type of external firm monitor, an on-site government-appointed Corporate Monitor, and assess whether such appointments reduce firms' propensity to violate laws. Using a sample of deferred and nonprosecution agreements, we first document the determinants of Monitor appointment. We find firms that voluntarily disclose wrongdoing and have more independent directors are less likely to have Corporate Monitors, whereas those with more severe infractions, mandate...
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作者：Goldstein, Itay; Yang, Shijie; Zuo, Luo
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Southern University of Science & Technology; National University of Singapore; Cornell University
摘要：Using the implementation of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system from 1993 to 1996 as a shock to information dissemination technologies, we examine how a significant reduction in disclosure processing costs affects the real economy. We find that the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in corporate investment and that this effect is concentrated in value firms. We provide evidence that improved equity financing and enhanced managerial incentives are likely...
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作者：Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. E.
作者单位：Universitetet i Stavanger; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：Reward systems based on balanced scorecards often connect pay to an index, that is, a weighted sum of multiple performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are nonverifiable so that the contracting parties must rely on self-enforcement. Under commonly invoked assumptions (including normally distributed measurements), we show that the weights in the index reflect a tradeoff between distortion and precision for the measures. The efficien...
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作者：Binz, Oliver; Hills, Robert; Kubic, Matthew
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We examine whether the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Codification made it easier for preparers and auditors to locate relevant accounting guidance. We find that areas of U.S. GAAP with more dispersed and voluminous guidance before the Codification experience a larger post-Codification reduction in restatements. We find a similar decline in SEC comment letter questions referencing areas of U.S. GAAP with more dispersed and voluminous pre-Codification guidance. Our results suggest ...
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作者：Wang, Lynn linghuan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper studies whether and how environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure regulations imposed on banks generate transmission effects along the lending channel. I use a setting of U.S. firms borrowing from non-U.S. banks and exploit the staggered adoption of ESG disclosure regulations in banks' home countries. I find that exposed borrowers of affected banks improve their environmental and social (E&S) performance following the disclosure mandate. Consistent with banks enhancing ...
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作者：Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要：A firm that must decide whether to retain or terminate a manager can rely on several sources of information to assess managerial ability. When it relies on a performance signal and monitoring, we show that a more informative signal can surprisingly increase the value of monitoring. Then, signal precision and monitoring are complements. This happens if a more precise information system makes some signals more negative indicators of managerial ability that still do not trigger termination. When ...
