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作者：Nan, Lin; Tang, Chao; Zhang, Gaoqing
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We examine the impact of increasing whistleblowing bounties on whistleblowers' strategy and regulatory efficiency in detecting fraud. Our analysis shows the regulator extracts information about the incidence of fraud from whistleblowers' actions, and the quality of such information depends on the size of whistleblowing bounties. With a larger bounty, upon receiving a whistleblowing report, the quality of the regulator's information about fraud deteriorates, whereas upon observing no whistleblo...
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作者：Tseng, Kevin; Zhong, Rong (Irene)
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; National Taiwan University; National Taiwan University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：This study examines whether and how financial statement comparability facilitates the dissemination of innovative knowledge between firms and stimulates the creation of new knowledge. Using cross-patent citations to track interfirm knowledge transfers, we find that comparability increases firms' incentives to learn from peers and create new patents that cite their peers' existing patents. The investigation into the mechanism reveals that comparability improves firms' ability to estimate the mo...
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作者：Hao, Jinji
作者单位：Victoria University Wellington
摘要：This paper shows that mandating some firms to disclose more while leaving other firms disclosing voluntarily is less effective in improving and may even harm the overall information environment when firms' disclosures are endogenous. Although the regulated firms' increased disclosure directly reduces all firms' cost of capital, it crowds out the unregulated firms' voluntary disclosure and thus increases all firms' cost of capital indirectly. Under certain circumstances, the negative indirect e...
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作者：Liang, Chuchu
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：Advertising is a critical competitive tool that shapes interactions among firms in the product market. Using third-party tracked data on advertising outlet costs, I find that a nontrivial portion of public firms, even those with intense advertising activities, do not disclose advertising expenses in their financial statements, indicating significant disclosure discretion. I further use product category-level advertising data to develop a firm-specific measure of advertising rivalry. I predict ...
