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作者：Ye, Pengfei; Zeng, Qingsheng; Zhang, Cheng
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We examine whether requiring insiders to sell their stock shares based on pre-disclosed plans can mitigate opportunistic insider selling activities and, more importantly, to what extent insiders can circumvent this regulation. Using China's mandate enacted in 2017 as the setting, we demonstrate that a sell-by-plan mandate can reduce opportunistic selling activities. However, insiders can circumvent this mandate by strategically initiating their plans before bad news. We find that this gaming p...
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作者：De Vito, Antonio; Hillmann, Lisa; Jacob, Martin; Vossebuerger, Robert
作者单位：University of Bologna; WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：This paper examines the role of personal income taxes on multinationals' corporate tax-induced profit shifting. As mandated in most OECD countries, firms need economic substance in low corporate-tax countries to justify profit shifting to these countries. Because high personal income taxes raise labor costs and thus the cost of providing economic substance, we predict that personal income taxes mute profit shifting. Using data from 26 European countries, we find that personal income taxes subs...
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作者：Defond, Mark; Qi, Baolei; Si, Yi; Zhang, Jieying
作者单位：University of Southern California; Xi'an Jiaotong University; Xi'an Jiaotong University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：Prior research concludes that tax-expert auditors facilitate tax aggressiveness. However, these studies examine auditors who also provide non-audit tax services to their clients, creating conflicting incentives. We predict that tax-expert auditors, who do not provide non-audit tax services, reduce tax aggressiveness, because tax aggressiveness imposes costs on them. We test our prediction using Chinese data, allowing us to identify Certified Tax Agents as tax-expert auditors. We find that comp...
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作者：Kim, Jinhwan; Shi, Terrence Tianshuo; Verdi, Rodrigo S.
作者单位：Stanford University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We examine how judicial efficiency, defined as a court's ability to resolve patent cases quickly and in a manner that is mutually agreeable to both parties in the lawsuit, impacts corporate innovation. To do so, we exploit the Patent Pilot Program (PPP) introduced by the U.S. Congress in 2011, which allowed judges with expertise and resources (as opposed to randomly selected judges) to preside over more patent cases to facilitate efficient ruling. We find firms headquartered in counties subjec...
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作者：Liu, Xiao; Ma, Zhiming; Ruan, Lufei
作者单位：Nankai University; Peking University; California State University System; San Francisco State University
摘要：This paper examines the effect of creditor protection on the choice of government procurement contract types. We use the staggered adoption of anti-recharacterization laws (ARLs) as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the research question. ARLs strengthen creditors' rights to repossess collateral in bankruptcy and thus enhance creditor protection. Using a dataset of U.S. government contracts, we find a significant shift from the use of fixed-price contracts to cost-plus contracts after ...
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作者：Rupar, Kathy; Wang, Sean; Yoon, Hayoung
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Southern Methodist University
摘要：We find that the adverse impact of bad news on analysts' valuations is 57% larger when the CEO is Non-White, resulting in more pessimistic valuations for Non-White CEOs relative to their White counterparts. Non-White CEO firms are more likely to surpass analysts' valuation targets in the subsequent 12 months, suggesting that this racial gap lacks economic justification. To provide further evidence of a racial bias: (1) we triangulate our empirical findings with corroborating evidence from a co...
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作者：Amberger, Harald J.; Wilde, Jaron H.; Wu, Yuchen
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of Iowa; Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We exploit the staggered adoption of beneficial ownership registers in the EU to study (i) whether and how the requirement to disclose information on an entity's ultimate human owner (ownership transparency) shapes cross-border investment, (ii) whether ownership transparency deters potentially illicit versus likely legitimate activity, and (iii) which types of firms try to avoid ownership disclosure. We find that investment from non-EU financial havens into the EU declines significantly after ...
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作者：Lester, Rebecca; Olbert, Marcel
作者单位：Stanford University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：Taxation is a central economic policy tool, with governments increasingly using tax policy to stimulate local economic growth and also regulate multinational firms. We review the empirical literature that studies the effect of tax policies on firms' investment, employment, and other real outcomes. Building on the neoclassical theory of corporate taxes and tangible investment, we propose an organizing framework for our review that captures the wide set of tax policies and firm responses examine...
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作者：Landsman, Wayne R.; Pena-Romera, F. Dimas; Zhao, Jianxin (Donny)
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Emory University
摘要：We predict that institutional investors in loan syndicates charge bellwether firms lower loan spreads as compensation for having access to private information that can help identify trading opportunities in other firms' public market securities. Consistent with this prediction, when lending to bellwether firms, institutional investors charge a loan premium that is between 17 and 25 bps lower relative to non-bellwether firms, and earn annualized excess returns of 1.5-2.2% from trading in other ...
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作者：Yang, Daniel G.
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：I examine whether and how foreign bank branch participation in U.S. loan syndicates influences loan contract design. I predict that foreign bank branches' dollar funding liquidity risk and information frictions increase renegotiation costs and affect loan contract design. I find that loan contracts with greater foreign bank branch participation include fewer flexibility-reducing covenants, such as capital expenditure and balance sheet covenants, that restrict borrowers from making positive net...
