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作者：Blaylock, Bradley S.
作者单位：Oklahoma State University System; Oklahoma State University - Stillwater
摘要：Two influential papers in the tax-avoidance literature (Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 2007) argue that aggressive forms of tax avoidance employ technologies that complement managerial rent extraction, and provide supporting evidence from firms in Russia. Several papers rely on this theory to motivate and interpret tests in a U.S. setting, but these tests are open to multiple interpretations. This paper investigates the extent to which shareholders of U.S. companies are a...
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作者：Gupta, Sanjay; Laux, Rick C.; Lynch, Daniel P.
作者单位：Michigan State University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We examine whether firms decrease tax reserves to meet analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts in the period prior to FIN 48, and whether that behavior changed following FIN 48. We use analysts' forecasts of pretax and after-tax income to impute premanaged earnings, or earnings before any tax manipulation. Pre-FIN 48, we observe that firms reduce their tax reserves (i.e., increase income) when premanaged earnings are below analysts' forecasts. Specifically, 78 percent of firm-quarters that woul...
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作者：Bloomfield, Robert
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：The stated goals of the SEC are to protect investors, maintain orderly markets and facilitate capital formation. These goals can be achieved with very light regulation if, as assumed by traditional economic theory, investors process information costlessly and protect themselves from informational disadvantages, and firms optimally balance the costs and benefits of committing to make their reports reliable. A growing body of research demonstrates that light regulation fails to achieve the SEC's...
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作者：Lisic, Ling Lei; Neal, Terry L.; Zhang, Ivy Xiying; Zhang, Yan
作者单位：George Mason University; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Binghamton University, SUNY
摘要：During the past decade, new regulations have been adopted to improve audit committee effectiveness. Prior research has generally provided evidence in support of these regulations and suggests that a more independent and expert audit committee is more effective. We posit that CEO power reduces or even eliminates the improvements in audit committee effectiveness resulting from independent and financially expert committee members. Thus, CEO power may result in an audit committee that appears effe...
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作者：Callen, Jeffrey L.; Chen, Feng; Dou, Yiwei; Xin, Baohua
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; New York University
摘要：This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime. We further show that in the high information asymmetry regime,...
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作者：Bloomfield, Robert
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：The stated goals of the SEC are to protect investors, maintain orderly markets and facilitate capital formation. These goals can be achieved with very light regulation if, as assumed by traditional economic theory, investors process information costlessly and protect themselves from informational disadvantages, and firms optimally balance the costs and benefits of committing to make their reports reliable. A growing body of research demonstrates that light regulation fails to achieve the SEC's...
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作者：Lisic, Ling Lei; Neal, Terry L.; Zhang, Ivy Xiying; Zhang, Yan
作者单位：George Mason University; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Binghamton University, SUNY
摘要：During the past decade, new regulations have been adopted to improve audit committee effectiveness. Prior research has generally provided evidence in support of these regulations and suggests that a more independent and expert audit committee is more effective. We posit that CEO power reduces or even eliminates the improvements in audit committee effectiveness resulting from independent and financially expert committee members. Thus, CEO power may result in an audit committee that appears effe...
