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作者：Sedatole, Karen L.; Swaney, Amy M.; Woods, Alexander
作者单位：Michigan State University; Central Michigan University; William & Mary
摘要：This study examines the implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence for individuals working in teams but facing explicit incentives based solely on measures of individual performance. We combine proprietary performance data with survey data for 133 internal auditors. We show that the social influences of relatively high levels of both horizontal monitoring and team member dependence provide implicit incentives that motivate individual performance, making the ...
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作者：Becker, Sebastian D.; Mahlendorf, Matthias D.; Schaffer, Utz; Thaten, Mario
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
摘要：This article examines how corporate reliance on budgets is affected by major changes in the economic environment. We combine survey and archival data from the economic crisis that began in 2008. The results indicate that budgeting became more important for planning and resource allocation but less important for performance evaluation in companies affected more strongly by the 2008 economic crisis. Additional evidence from interviews and data gathered in a focus group further illustrate these r...
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作者：Bauer, Andrew M.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：I examine whether corporate tax avoidance is associated with internal control weaknesses (ICWs) disclosed under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). ICWs disclosed under SOX are frequently related to a firm's tax function. When pervasive ICWs exist, the likelihood increases that these frequent tax-related ICWs spill over from financial reporting issues to tax avoidance objectives. Thus, my research helps corporate stakeholders understand the implications of internal controls beyond simply financial r...
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作者：Kim, Chansog (Francis); Zhang, Liandong
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：This study investigates the relation between corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness. We study a broad array of corporate political activities, including the employment of connected directors, campaign contributions, and lobbying. Using a large hand-collected data set of U.S. firms' political connections, we find that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than nonconnected firms, after controlling for other determinants of tax aggressiveness, industry and year fixe...
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作者：Demirkan, Sebahattin; Zhou, Nan
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Morgan State University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Binghamton University, SUNY
摘要：We study the pricing of audit services for strategic alliances, a governance structure involving an incomplete contract between separate firms. Since incomplete contracts do not specify all future contingencies, we expect that the nonverifiability of information and potential agency behavior in alliances increase audit complexity, resulting in higher audit fees. Our findings support this prediction. We then separate strategic alliances into joint ventures and contractual alliances, as the latt...
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作者：Kim, Jeong-Bon; Zhang, Liandong
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：Using a large sample of U.S. firms during 1964-2007, we find that conditional conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of a firm's future stock price crashes. This finding holds for multiple measures of conditional conservatism and crash risk and is robust to controlling for other known determinants of crash risk and firm-fixed effects. Moreover, we find that the relation between conservatism and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. Overall, our ...
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作者：Lau, Sie Ting; Shrestha, Keshab; Yu, Jing
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; Monash University; Monash University Malaysia; University of Western Australia
摘要：Using firm-level data from 23 developed markets, we document a positive association between overall firm-level governance quality and the informativeness of earnings announcements measured by abnormal stock return variance. This finding is robust after controlling for the potential endogeneity of firm-level corporate governance. Further analyses reveal that firms with strong governance show little evidence of earnings management, appoint Big 4 auditing firms, and attract analyst following, imp...
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作者：Kachelmeier, Steven J.; Rasmussen, Stephanie J.; Schmidt, Jaime J.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Texas System; University of Texas Arlington
摘要：We use information extracted from a major proxy advisory service to test predictions from institutional theory regarding when and why audit committee (AC) members experience turnover because of evidence of ineffective governance. First, we broadly categorize AC ineffectiveness concerns as either (i) financial reporting failures or (ii) characteristics of individual AC members. Institutional theory suggests that the visible nature of the first category is more likely to threaten perceptions of ...
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作者：Hong, Hyun A.; Hung, Mingyi; Zhang, Jieying
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This study investigates how the use of debt covenants around the world varies with legal institutions. On the basis of syndicated loans in 36 countries, we find that debt covenants are more prevalent in countries with stronger law enforcement and weaker creditor rights, suggesting that law enforcement facilitates, and creditor rights substitute for, the use of covenants. We also find that the substitution effect between covenant use and creditor rights exists mainly in countries with strong la...
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作者：Luft, Joan; Shields, Michael D.; Thomas, Tyler F.
作者单位：Michigan State University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Organizations have often been criticized for reliance on a single item of accounting information (e.g., profit) in evaluating performance, because of its incompleteness. We provide theory-based experimental evidence that under frequently occurring performance-evaluation conditions (subjective performance evaluation, causal ambiguity, and individual differences in cognitive ability, knowledge, and/or motivation that lead to different interpretations of information), reliance on a single item of...
