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作者：Hofmann, Christian; Indjejikian, Raffi J.
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study three elements of management control: incentive compensation, performance monitoring, and delegation of authority to managers to contract with lower-level employees. Using a principal-agent model, we highlight important direct and indirect interactions between and among these endogenous control elements, themes often emphasized in the economics and accounting literatures using the analogy of a three-legged stool. We identify circumstances in which control elements are complements or s...
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作者：Austin, Ashley A.; Carpenter, Tina D.; Christ, Margaret H.; Nielson, Christy S.
作者单位：University of Richmond; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Mississippi
摘要：Data analytics is transforming our global markets and significantly impacting the financial reporting environment. We investigate how auditors, company managers, and regulation interact with data analytics and one another to affect the diffusion (i.e., development and spread) of data analytics throughout the financial reporting environment. We interview company managers and their audit partners, as well as additional stakeholders, including regulators. We interpret findings from our interviews...
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作者：Ewert, Ralf; Wagenhofer, Alfred
作者单位：University of Graz
摘要：Although internal control over financial reporting has gained increasing regulatory attention, its enforcement is far from perfect; thus, firm-specific incentives to management become important to increase the quality of financial reports. We study how owners can motivate managers to invest in accounting quality even though it is costly to the managers. Using an agency model, we establish that a sufficiently conservative accounting system (which understates performance) is necessary to induce ...
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作者：Hardies, Kris; Lennox, Clive; Li, Bing
作者单位：University of Antwerp; University of Southern California; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：Prior research finds that women receive lower salaries than men. Similarly, we show that female audit partners in Belgium receive significantly lower compensation than male partners. However, there are alternative explanations for the pay gap other than gender discrimination. For example, the gap in compensation could reflect that men are paid more because they have higher levels of productivity. We provide new predictions and tests of gender discrimination by comparing the fees generated by a...
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作者：Iselin, Michael; Liao, Scott; Zhang, Haiwen (Helen)
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Toronto
摘要：We examine whether bank connections via common mutual fund ownership serve as a contagion channel affecting the systemic risk of the banking system. Examining this relation is important because common mutual fund ownership has increased dramatically over the past 20 years, and a buildup of systemic risk was at the heart of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. We predict and document that the extent of a bank's connection with other banks via common ownership increases its contribution to systemic r...
